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I. Introduction

"The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we
purchasegoods by them. "I
Federal trademark law stands at a crossroads. In the case of Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court cast the vitality of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA),3 and with it the bifurcated structure of
the federal trademark regime, into serious doubt. Since that decision, courts and
commentators have debated exactly what trademark dilution is and how it differs
from trademark infringement, 4 and practitioners have struggled to advise their
clients as to the availability and merits of federal dilution claims.' Most recently,

'Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)
2537 U.S. 418 (2003).
3 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
4 See generally Barton Beebe et al., Trademark Dilution: Moseley and Beyond, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

& ENT. L.J. 849 (2004) (discussing the rippling effects of Moseley on trademark law); see also id. at 863 ("Because
there has kind of been a blurring, if you'll pardon the term, between the infringement and unfair competition
portions of the statute and the dilution sections of the statute, it really has left the law as [a]kind of mishmash,
where people don't really know where they stand.").
5See J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States Law Compared,94 TRADEMARK
REP. 1163, 1167 (2004) ("Judges and attorneys are unclear as to exactly what 'dilution' is and how to prove it.
Consistency and predictability are hard to find. Giving legal advice about the federal anti-dilution law is a high
risk endeavor.").
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Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, a statute designed
specifically to abrogate the Court's decision and clarify Congress's intent with
respect to the dilution remedy.6 Whether clarity in the law will follow is still an
open question.
Much of this confusion stems from formalist doctrinal architecture that has
been handed down over the past 135 years of development in American trademark
law. For generations judges, legislators, and scholars have attempted to fit the
square peg of trademark law into the round holes of either property law or unfair
competition law, often at the expense of the real issues at stake in trademark
regimes. It is the position of this article that the modem doctrines of trademark
infringement and trademark dilution are best understood not as distinct species of
harms to a particular type of property right, nor even as subsets of the law of unfair
competition, but rather as related and overlapping categories of consumers'
cognitive responses to certain commercial behavior.
The "likelihood of confusion" standard of the Lanham Act 7 has long been
used to apply liability for trademark infringement under the rubric of unfair
competition. This standard is unhelpful, however, in analyzing dilution, which
explicitly rejects the Lanham Act's likelihood of confusion standard, and does not
require any actual or potential competition as a prerequisite to liability. The
juxtaposition of this doctrinal incompatibility with American trademark law's
historical conceptual aversion to property rights has grossly complicated any
coherent integration of dilution into the federal trademark regime. Though the tools
of doctrinal development have to date been unhelpful in providing a coherent
theory of dilution within the broader law of trademarks, the insights of cognitive
psychology-which have been brought to bear in other areas of legal analysis under
the aegis of "behavioralism" 8-provide an elegant and robust framework for the
positive analysis of all varieties of trademark cases.
Behavioralism posits that human beings are not perfectly rational actors in the
model of classical economics, but rather that we exhibit what has been termed
"bounded rationality." In particular, numerous studies have documented that we
tend to arrive at decisions by means of heuristics: mental short-cuts that generate
factual or probabilistic judgments in the face of limited information, time, and
resources. 9 While many heuristics are often relatively accurate, and therefore
6

Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006); see 152 CONG.

REC. S 1923 (Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (describing the TDRA as a measure to clarify Congress's
intent in the wake of Moseley, and undo that case's central holding).
7 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1129 (2006)).
8 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).

9 The original authoritative collection of research in this field is JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY]. A new volume was recently published expanding on the work in the 1982 collection. HEURISTICS
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman
eds., 2002) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT].
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useful, some heuristics constitute persistent cognitive biases that can generate
persistent errors. This article argues that infringement and dilution are best
understood as commercial behavior that manipulates the cognitive biases of
consumers, and as such threatens to render their heuristic judgments persistently
inaccurate. In this view, trademark liability-whether imposed under the label of
infringement or dilution-serves neither to protect property rights of trademark
owners, nor to protect them against the unfair trade practices of competitors, but to
shape consumer markets in such a way as to conform to the innate cognitive
processes of boundedly rational consumers. The trademark regime can thus be
understood as a legal apparatus designed (albeit perhaps unconsciously) to
accommodate and even harness non-rational human thought processes, rather than
suppress or eradicate them. The judicial outcomes of such a regime may be
essentially indistinguishable from those of a system of property rights, but it will
become clear that this resemblance is more a function of the mechanics of systemic
market regulation than of any proprietary interest created under the law.
Part II of this article outlines the theoretical and doctrinal antagonism between
the doctrines of trademark dilution and traditional trademark infringement, with an
eye to the features of each that have historically kept them distinct from one
another. Part III dissects the various species of trademark liability that have
developed under this bifurcated trademark regime. Part IV applies the theoretical
and empirical insights of cognitive psychology to the elements of trademark
doctrine outlined in Part III. Part V collects these insights into a cohesive
theoretical framework for all species of trademark liability. The article closes with
some practical concerns surrounding the adoption of this framework, anticipating
objections, and suggesting future roles for Congress, the courts, and the trademark
bar. 10
II. Schechter's Legacy
In 1927 a New York lawyer by the name of Frank Schechter, then trademark
counsel to the BVD company,"I published an article in the HarvardLaw Review
lamenting the rigidity and formalism of federal trademark doctrine.' 2 At the time,
federal trademark protection was limited to the remedies provided in the patchwork
of half-measures Congress had enacted since 1881.13 For over fifty years federal
trademark law had been developing step by timid step within the strict boundaries

10The arguments and claims of this article are theoretical rather than empirical in nature.

Nevertheless, the

arguments presented here are reasoned by analogy from empirical work in cognitive and consumer psychology,
and it is anticipated that targeted empirical testing would confirm them. Such testing, however, is beyond the
scope of the present undertaking and awaits further development.
1Beebe et al., supra note 4, at 853.
12 Frank

1.Schechter, The Rational Basis of TrademarkProtection,40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927).

13 See, e.g., I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:3, at 5-9 nn.8-9,

15 & 16 (2004) (citing the "crazy quilt of modifications and amendments" between 1905 and the Lanham Act).
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of the Supreme Court's 1879 ruling in the Trade-Mark Cases,14 which seemed to
have been crafted to keep Congress out of the trademark area altogether.,5 In that
ruling, the Court struck down the first federal trademark statute as
unconstitutional. 16 The Court held that Congress had no authority under the Patent
and Copyright Clause' 7 to confer property rights in trademarks.' 8 It further held
that because the Act of 1870 made no distinction between interstate or foreign
commerce on the one hand, and intrastate commerce on the other, 19 Congress had
overstepped its bounds under the Commerce Clause.2 ° Moreover, the Court
expressed in dicta considerable hostility to the idea that trademarks were within the
scope of the Commerce power at all.2 '
The legacy of the Trade-Mark Cases-in particular their interpretation of the
Patent and Copyright Clause-was to instill in federal trademark doctrine a
crippling aversion to anything that resembled a property right. Even after the
infirmities of the 1870 Act had been ameliorated,22 the Supreme Court continued to
warn that "[tihere is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark

4In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
The Court seemed convinced that the states offered ample protection for trademarks, and that Congress's foray into
the arena was superfluous:

'5

The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the person
whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized by the common law and the
chancery courts of England and of this country, and by the statutes of some of the States. It is a property right for
the violation of which damages may be recovered in an action at law, and the continued violation of it will be
enjoined by a court of equity, with compensation for past infringement. This exclusive right was not created by the
act of Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement. The whole system of trade-mark property
and the civil remedies for its protection existed long anterior to that act, and have remained in full force since its
passage.
Id. at 92.
16Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, invalidated by In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99
(1879).
17U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
'8

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94 ("Any attempt, however, to identify the essential characteristics of a trademark with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the writings of authors, will show that the
effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties. The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery.").

19 The Court blithely assumed that "trade or traffic between citizens of the same State" constituted "perhaps the

largest" share of the commerce regulated by the Act. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879).
20 See id. at 96-99.

21 Id. at 95 ("Every species of property which is the subject of commerce, or which is used or even essential in

commerce, is not brought by this [Commerce] clause within the control of Congress.").
22 The

next attempt at a federal trademark statute was limited to "trade-marks used in commerce with foreign nations,

or with the Indian tribes." Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 1, 21 Stat. 502, 502. Marks used in commerce "among
the several States" were brought under the federal trademark regime in 1905. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No.
58-84, § 1,33 Stat. 724, 724.
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is employed."2 3 The trademark was no more than an indication of a product's
connection to its manufacturer, and the trademark right was accordingly understood
as quasi-proprietary: it differs from rights "in gross or at large, like a statutory
copyright or a patent for an invention," in that it "grows out of its use.",24 In
practical terms, this distinction meant that a trademark could only be enforced in
the geographic and commercial sphere within which it was actually used by its
owner to indicate a product's source. For example, in United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., the Supreme Court rejected a claim of infringement by a
manufacturer of medicinal preparations under the name "Regis" in New England
against a manufacturer of medicinal preparations under the same name in
Kentucky, on the grounds that the two markets were "separate and remote from
each other, so that the mark means one thing in one market, [and] an entirely
different thing in another., 25 Similarly, the federal statute in place at the time only
imposed liability for the use of trademarks on goods of "substantially the same
descriptive properties" as those of the trademark owner-in other words, goods that
directly competed with those of the trademark owner.2 6 The prevailing justification
offered by the courts for these doctrines strikes us today as sophistry: "[T]here can
be no unfair competition where there is no competition at all." 27
Such was the state of the law when Schechter penned his famous article. His
basic premise was that the historical function of trademarks embodied in AngloAmerican law-identifying the origin or ownership of goods-was an obsolete
relic of a localized mode of commerce driven by craftsmen, guilds, and individual
merchants. 28 Schechter argued that in a complex modem economy where the
manufacturers of goods were often unknown to the purchasers of those goods,
23 United
24

Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (emphasis added).

Id.

" Id. at 100.
26 Trademark

Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728. This principle was reinforced by the Supreme

Court, which cited with approval the English rule that trademarks were
on which they were used by a plaintiff: "If he does not carry on a trade
stamps a lion on his linen, another person may stamp a lion on iron."
U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (quoting Ainsworth v. Walmsley, 1 L.R.Eq.

only enforceable within the class of goods
in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240
518, 524 (1866)). While the American

preoccupation with property rights in trademarks stemmed from the strictures of the Patent and Copyright Clause,
the British rule was based on the early view, long since abandoned, that proprietary rights in trademarks were
monopolistic and therefore bad policy. See Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484, 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (1742) (denying an
injunction against alleged trademark piracy on grounds that to do so would grant monopolistic rights); see also
Norma Dawson, English Trade Mark Law in the Eighteenth Century: Blanchard v. Hill Revisited-Another "Case
of Monopolies "?, 24 J. LEGAL HIST. 111 (2003) (exploring the historical background of the Blanchard case).
27Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principlesof Unfair Competition to Cases of DissimilarProducts, 75 U.
PA. L. REV. 197, 198 & n.4 (1927) (citing cases). On the view that such pronouncements and the theory behind
them actually embody an intellectually coherent normative agenda focusing on the regulation of competition
among producers, in sharp contrast to current trademark doctrine's concern with consumer protection, see
generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007).
28 Schechter, supra note 12, at 814 ("Four hundred years ago a trademark indicated either the origin or ownership of

the goods to which it was affixed. To what extent does the trademark of today really function as either? Actually,
not in the least!").
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"[t]he true functions of the trademark are . . . to identify a product as satisfactory
and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public. 29 In the
commercial reality of the impersonal marketplace, he argued, trademarks served
not merely to symbolize the goodwill of their owners in the mind of consumers, but
as a vehicle for building and storing such goodwill.3 °
Schechter believed that the framing of trademark doctrine under the rubric of
unfair competition-specifically the doctrine of "passing off'-inadequately
protected this important function of trademarks. 3 1 He traced the law's shortcoming
specifically to the two features of trademark law outlined above: the resistance to
trademark rights that resembled property rights "in gross" rather than "of use," and
the concomitant limitation of trademark liability to competing goods within a
geographically-defined market.3 2 Yet rather than directly challenge the federal
courts' hostility to full property rights in trademarks, Schechter proposed an
33
alternative theory of trademark liability derived from German law-dilution.
Schechter's theory of dilution rested on the premise that the ability of a trademark
to serve as a vehicle for creating and perpetuating goodwill depends on its
"uniqueness," and that multiple unrelated uses of an unusual or distinctive mark
will prevent that mark from developing a strong, unique hold on the public
consciousness.3 4 This theory would give the first user of a particularly unique or
distinctive mark the right to enforce her mark broadly-not merely within the
geographic markets in which she operated, but also in neighboring regions; not
merely against competing products, but also against sellers of non-competing
goods-all on the theory that any interference with her efforts to build and retain
the association of goodwill with her trademark threatens gradually to weaken that
association, thereby reducing her incentive to cultivate such goodwill.35
Built into Schechter's new theory of trademark law is a tension that was
uniquely a product of the legal regime of Schechter's era, yet one that continues to
influence trademark doctrine to this day. Schechter was proposing a remedy for an
injury that courts of the time had considered but refused to redress: the harm to a
trademark owner caused by a second comer's use of the mark on non-competing
goods. In order to support the new remedy without running afoul of contemporary
doctrine that limited trademark rights to the commercial sphere of their actual use,
29Schechter, supra note 12, at 818.

supra note 12, at 818-19 ("[T]oday the trademark is not merely the symbol of good will but often the
most effective agent for the creation of good will, imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous and impersonal
guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions.").

30 Schechter,

3' Schechter, supra note 12, at 820 (noting that the law of England and the United States aimed "simply to prevent the

deceitful sale or passing off of goods made by one person or firm for goods made by another" (quoting Myron W.
Watkins, The Change in Trust Policy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 815, 831 (1922))).
32Schechter, supra note 12, at 821-24.
33Schechter, supra note 12, at 831-33.
34Schechter, supra note 12, at 824-26.
35Schechter, supra note 12, at 825-33.

TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 15:331

Schechter was forced to invent an alternative theory of injury arising from the same
conduct he sought a legal remedy against. To that end, he advanced a slipperyslope argument concerning an incidental effect of unauthorized use on the
trademark owner-the potential but as-yet-unrealized cumulative effect of repeated
unauthorized use of the owner's mark on non-competing goods-rather than the
more obvious direct effect of unauthorized use of trademarks on non-competing
goods: the invocation of consumer goodwill associated with the mark.36 Schechter
used this somewhat misleading technique despite the fact that the unauthorized
invocation of goodwill, rather than its potential long-term erosion, appeared to be
his primary concern. 37 The result of this theoretical shell game is a bifurcation of
the concept of dilution into two separate and somewhat antagonistic theories. The
first theory focuses on the level of uniqueness of the owner's mark, regardless of
any benefit a second comer might derive from its use. I will refer to this theory as
the "uniqueness theory" of trademark liability. The second theory focuses on a
second comer's unauthorized invocation of the goodwill associated with the mark,
regardless of the immediate effect on the trademark owner. I will call this the
"free-riding theory" of trademark liability. Whether the dilution remedy is properly
directed at the trademark owner's injury (the uniqueness theory) or the second
comer's benefit (the free-riding theory) is a debate that continues to this day, as will
be seen below.3 8
Regardless of the true justification for his proposed remedy, Schechter's call
for a radical reconceptualization of trademark law received a cool reception among
federal authorities. As Schechter had noted in his own article,39 the "same
descriptive qualities" requirement under the 1905 Act was already being
liberalized, and the process continued without any radical statutory or doctrinal
innovations.40 Not until the advent of the revolution in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence ushered in by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish4 1 was there any
serious reformulation of federal trademark law, and even that left dilution squarely
out of the picture. A few years after West Coast Hotel Co. was decided, the
Lanham Act was passed, laying the groundwork for the next half-century of
American trademark law. 42 Rather than broadly rethinking the nature and function
36See

generally Schechter, supra note 12, at 824-30.

37 See Schechter, supra note 12, at 825 (alluding to the "subtle[ty] and refine[ment]" of "[t]rademark pirates" who

"proceed circumspectly, by suggestion and approximation, rather than by direct and exact duplication of their
victims' wares and marks").
38See infra text accompanying notes 56-77.
39See Schechter, supra note 12, at 823-24.
40 Compare Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) ("[A] merchant may have a sufficient

economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a
court."), with Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) (finding infringement of a
trademark used on syrup in use of the same mark on related products such as pancake batter).
4'

300 U.S. 379 (1937).

42 The

Lanham Act was introduced by Congressman Lanham the year after West Coast Hotel Co. was decided, but

the pressures of war and the vagaries of the legislative process prevented its enactment until 1946. For narrative
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of trademarks, as Schechter suggested, the new statute set off a gradual expansion
of liability within the historical traditions of Anglo-American trademark doctrine.
For example, section 32 of the Lanham Act-which defines infringement of
registered trademarks-eliminated the same-descriptive-properties requirement in
favor of a flexible standard for determining infringement that is still largely with us:
whether an allegedly infringing use is "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods. 4 3 A later amendment
removed the explicit reference to "source of origin" from this provision, 4 further
loosening but not quite casting off the historical tether on federal trademark law
that Schechter had lambasted as an archaism.4 5 Meanwhile, judicial interpretation
of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act-which by its terms originally prohibited only
"false designations of origin" 46 but over time became the primary vehicle for
enforcing unregistered trademarks, service marks, and trade dress-broadened the
scope of the confusion inquiry, and a 1988 amendment to section 43(a) essentially
codified these judicial innovations, prohibiting the commercial use of any mark that
"is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
47
another person.,
Taken together these amendments expanded upon, but never discarded, the
Anglo-American common law tradition of treating trademarks as designators of
source or origin. The Lanham Act continues to directly address the consumer's
perception of the information a mark conveys about the relationship between the
mark's owner and the product bearing the mark; the universe of relevant
relationships has simply expanded. The result has been liberalization of some of
the more arbitrary doctrines Schechter disdained. For example, the samedescriptive-properties rule that emanated from the antipathy to trademark rights in
gross, already weakened in cases such as Yale and Aunt Jemima,48 gave way under
the Lanham Act to a self-consciously flexible standard that extends trademark
histories of the formulation and promulgation of the Lanham Act, see Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the
Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 177-81 (1949), and I MCCARTHY, supra note
13, § 5:4, at 5-10 to -13.
43 See Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, sec. 32(1), 60 Stat. 427, 437 (codified as amended

at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006)).
44 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769, 773.
45 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46 Lanham

Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. at 441 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006)).

47 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA), Pub. L. No. 100-667, sec. 132, § 43(a)(1), 102 Stat. 3935, 3946

(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A) (2006)). The TLRA's amendment of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was
made "in large part to codify the case law interpretation of the previous version of § 43(a)." 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 13, § 5:9(5), at 5-17; accord Marie V. Driscoll, The "New" 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REP. 238, 239 (1989).

48See Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) ("[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic
interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court."); Aunt
Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) (finding infringement of a trademark used on syrup

in use of the same mark on related products such as pancake batter).
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infringement liability to "related goods" on a case-by-case basis. 49 Thus, for nearly
fifty years federal trademark law gradually broadened the scope of liability to
encompass much-but not all-of the conduct Schechter had complained of,
without abandoning the conceptual framework inherited from the previous century
of doctrinal development.
In the face of federal complacency, a few states supplemented the federal
regime with their own dilution statutes. In 1947, Massachusetts became the first
state to enact a dilution statute along the lines suggested in Schechter's article. 50
The trademark bar promoted this trend with a model state trademark statute that
included a section on dilution. 51 Nevertheless, by 1995 only about half of the states
had enacted any kind of dilution statute.52 That year, Congress finally responded to
the pleas of the trademark plaintiffs' bar for a federal dilution statute and enacted
the FTDA.53 The FTDA created a federal cause of action for trademark dilution,54
defining the injury in Schechterian terms:
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
55
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.

The FTDA's provision for relief "regardless of the presence or absence of
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties" embracedeven more completely than the "related products" standard 56 -Schechter's call for
a remedy against unauthorized use of a mark "upon non-competing goods. 5 7 And
in defining dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services," the text of the FTDA nearly perfectly embodied
the uniqueness theory of dilution. 58 The legislative history of the statute, however,
49See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, §§ 24:5-:6, at 24-11 to -16.
jurisprudence are discussed infra Part 11I.A.

Cases illustrating this feature of Lanham Act

501947 Mass. Acts 300.
51 MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (U.S. Trademark Assoc. 1964); MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL

§

13

(U.S. Trademark Assoc. 1992).
52See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.

53Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
54

Id.sec. 3,

§ 43(c)(1)

(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006)).

55Id. sec. 4, 109 Stat. at 986 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)). The statutory definition of "dilution" was
subsequently amended and moved to a different section of the Code. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
(TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, sec. 2(1), §43(c)(2)(B)-(C), 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
56See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, §§ 24:5-:6, at 24-11 to -16 and text accompanying supra note 49.
57Schechter, supra note 12, at 825.
58FTDA sec. 4, 109 Stat. at 986. The uniqueness theory is premised on the notion that use of a single mark to
identify a potentially unlimited variety of goods reduces its ability to identify any particular good. See supra notes
32-35 and accompanying text.
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suggests that the lawmakers who crafted it were more swayed by the free-riding
theory of dilution, as the committee report stated: "The concept of dilution
recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the mark and the
commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who
would appropriate the mark for their own gain." 59 Thus, in adopting Schechter's
remedy, Congress fell victim to the contradiction inherent in its underlying
justification, even though the doctrines that gave rise to that contradiction had been
moribund for decades. Nor did the FTDA revisit the theoretical underpinnings of
all trademark law as Schechter had attempted; it simply grafted the dilution remedy
on to the corpus of traditional trademark law embodied in the Lanham Act, while
leaving traditional trademark law intact.
This tenuous parallel system of trademark remedies is the result of the tension
among the competing theories of trademark liability identified in this part: the
uniqueness theory, which holds that trademark liability should be imposed to
provide manufacturers with the means and incentive to create and preserve
consumer goodwill; and the free-riding theory, which holds that trademark liability
should be imposed to prevent second comers from misappropriating the consumer
goodwill generated by another's trademark. In confronting this theoretical tension
while still maintaining their aversion to trademark rights in gross, courts
interpreting the FTDA attempted to shoehom dilution law into the common law
theory. The courts thereby exposed not only the incompatibility between the
infringement and dilution remedies as currently conceived, but also the
inconsistency of modem trademark infringement doctrine with the common law
theory of trademarks as identifiers of source.
Early judicial efforts to systematize federal dilution doctrine were generally
confused and chaotic .60 The Supreme Court first stepped into the fray in 2003 in
the case of Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.61 The Moseley Court, following an
earlier Fourth Circuit opinion,62 held that to prevail under the FTDA a plaintiff
must prove "actual dilution," not mere "likelihood of dilution," although actual
economic harm need not be proven.63 However, where the Fourth Circuit's

SH.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
60See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th

Cir. 1999) (holding that the FTDA required a showing of actual-as opposed to likely-dilution, as well as
economic harm); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that likelihood of
dilution is sufficient to make out an FTDA claim and announcing a sprawling ten-factor test for dilution, all while
practically admitting that the court did not fully understand what dilution is); see also I.P. Lund Trading ApS v.
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998) (criticizing some factors applied by the Second Circuit in a dilution
case under New York law, which factors also appeared in the Nabisco test); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,
259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir. 2001) (adopting the Nabisco analysis), rev'd, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Times Mirror
Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (collating the Nabisco test
with an earlier Second Circuit test for state law dilution claims).
6! 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003).
62 See

Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d 449.

63 Moseley,

537 U.S. at 432-33.
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requirement of "actual, consummated dilution" had been premised on an
understanding of dilution as a harm caused by "a sufficient similarity between the
junior and senior marks to evoke an 'instinctive mental association' of the two by a
relevant universe of consumers,, 64 the Moseley Court criticized the "mental
association" test. The Court reasoned that "the mere fact that consumers mentally
associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark" was insufficient to establish
actionable dilution because it would "not necessarily reduce the capacity of the
famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for
dilution under the FTDA. 6 5 According to Moseley, dilution had little to do with
consumer reaction to the defendant's mark, and everything to do with consumer
reaction to the plaintiff's mark in a world where the defendant's mark exists.6 6
This feature of the Moseley opinion would seem to mark an inflection point in
the theoretical tug-of-war over dilution doctrine. The Moseley Court essentially
rejected the free-riding theory of dilution implied by the legislative history of the
FTDA in favor of a dilution doctrine that hews as closely as possible to uniqueness
theory embodied in the statutory text. By literally reading the FTDA's uniquenessbased description of the dilution injury, the Moseley Court made explicit the
internal contradictions of dilution doctrine that Congress and Schechter had
attempted to dodge. Although Congress may have intended to promulgate a freeriding theory of dilution 67 -and apparently still has that intent 68 -the Supreme
Court obliged (or perhaps dared) Congress to make that intent explicit in statutory
language. In order to do so, Congress would have to finally acknowledge what
Schechter could not: that the policy underlying the free-riding theory of dilution is
essentially an extension of traditional common law infringement policy beyond the
formalist limits set by the Trade-Mark Cases and their progeny. The traditional
concept of "passing off"-perhaps the earliest recognized cause of action in
trademark law and the source from which modem infringement doctrine

64Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.

65Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
66

Id. at 433-34.

67 See supra note

59 and accompanying text.

68 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H2122 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (stating, in the

context of debate over the TDRA, "Unfortunately, there are those in both commercial and noncommercial settings
who would seize upon the popularity of a trademark for their own purposes and at the expense of the rightful
owner and the public"). Congress is not alone in subscribing to the free-riding theory of dilution. See, e.g., Beebe
et al., supra note 4, at 881-83 (characterizing dilution as a doctrine within a historical chain of equitable trademark
decisions guarding against misappropriation of goodwill); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50
(1st Cir. 1998) ("[l]t appears that an entirely different issue is at stake [in the plaintiff's theory of its dilution
claim]-not interference with the source signaling function but rather protection from an appropriation of or free
riding on the investment Lund has made in its design."); cf Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369
N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977) (noting that New York's dilution statute was designed to curb the "cancer-like
growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinctive
trade-mark or name").
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developed 69 --envisions an unauthorized use of a mark that deceives the consumer
into purchasing a second corner's goods instead of the trademark owner's; the
primary distinction between this scenario and free-riding dilution is that in the latter
instance the "free ride" does not result in the substitution of a sale of defendant's
products for a sale of plaintiffs products (by reason of the absence of market
proximity). 70 To extend liability for dilution to the latter case, a dilution statute
reflecting an anti-free-riding policy rather than pro-uniqueness policy was
necessary.
Congress took a step in this direction in late 2006 with its passage of the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA). 7 1 The TDRA was consciously drafted
as a rejection of the Moseley Court's insistence on proof of actual (as opposed to
likely) dilution. 72 More significantly, the TDRA departs from the uniqueness
theory of dilution in favor of the free-riding theory. 73 The FTDA had defined
dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services," a standard that (as interpreted in Moseley) focused
exclusively on the effect of a defendant's use on a plaintiffs mark.74 The TDRA
redefines dilution as an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark that [either] impairs the distinctiveness ... [or]
harms the reputation of the famous mark" 7 5-a standard that focuses both on
impairment of the plaintiffs mark and on the mental associations drawn by
consumers confronted with the defendant's mark, drawing a causal connection
between the two phenomena. Moreover, the statute grants special remedies against
defendants who "willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous

69See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 27 (arguing that the early historical development of Anglo-American trademark
law reflects above all a concern for protecting producers against diversion of their trade through competitors'
passing off).
70 Cf Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2002) (arguing from the legislative history

of the FTDA that "Congress sought to prevent.. . out-of-market free riding"); Stacey L. Dogan,
103,
104 (2006),
What
Is Dilution, Anyway?,
105
MICH.
L.
REV.
FIRST
IMPRESSIONS
(characterizing this understanding of
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll05/dogan.pdf
dilution under the FTDA as "conclusory," "overarching" and at odds with Schechter's theory). This dismissal of
concern for diversion of trade reflects the historical shift away from producer-focused trademark policy and toward

consumer protection theories of trademark law described by Professor McKenna in his forthcoming article. See
McKenna, supra note 27.
7'Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).

72H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 5 (2005), as reprintedin 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091.
73 In contrast to the analysis herein, Professor Beebe contends that the statute consciously does not reflect a
"misappropriation" theory of dilution, but instead separate and distinct theories of "blurring" and "tamishment"
which rely neither on uniqueness nor free-riding justifications. Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal
Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1143, 1145-47, 1164-65 (2006).

74Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA), Pub. L. No. 104-98, sec. 4, 109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)). The statutory definition of "dilution" was subsequently amended and moved to a
different section of the Code. TDRA, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(B)-(C), 120 Stat. at 1731 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)).
75TDRA, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(B)-(C), 120 Stat. at 1731.
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mark"-as clear a statement of anti-free-riding policy as one could imagine.76 In
short, the consumer's mental association between a new mark and a famous
existing mark has become the touchstone of dilution under the TDRA, giving
congressional blessing to the causal reasoning and anti-free-riding policy that the
Moseley Court rejected. 77
The theoretical parallels between infringement and dilution are mirrored in the
practical application of the two doctrines. As will be discussed below, 78 the factors
laid out by Congress for establishing a TDRA claim largely mirror those already
used by courts to establish an infringement claim, suggesting that dilution and
infringement share affinities more complex than a common general policy against
free-riding. The remainder of this article will endeavor to identify and explain
those affinities as a function of the influence of trademarks on the cognitive
psychology of consumer decision-making.
Il1. The Species of Trademark Liability
Even after the developments discussed in the previous part, federal trademark
doctrine remains wedded to the common law's conceptual nexus of a mark and a
manufacturer-between a source and its symbol. Although the Lanham Act
doctrine of confusion has now broadened from its original scope of source of origin
to include concepts such as affiliation, connection, or sponsorship, all of these
concepts relate back to the manufacturer; they speak not to the consumer's general
beliefs about the trademark-bearing product but to her specific belief about the
marked product's relationship to an entity-even an anonymous or unknown
entity-that owns the mark. 7 9 Dilution doctrine, in contrast, appears mainly
concerned with the stability of that specific belief; it is designed either to prevent
the consumer from associating a famous mark with more than one manufacturer, or
to shield that association from the influence of other manufacturers. Ostensibly,
then, all of trademark liability doctrine is concerned with the consumer's mental
association between a mark and a maker-indeed, courts go so far as to construct
an unknown, anonymous manufacturer in the consumer's mind in order to preserve
this doctrinal focus.80 However, as this part will show, courts often assess this
76Id. sec.

2(1), § 43(c)(5)(B)(i), 120 Stat. at 1732.

77As one commentator said when analyzing the new statute, "If experience is any guide, some courts will feel

tempted to make the causal leap between mental association and dilution, and conclude that any use that calls to
mind a famous mark will probably dilute it." Dogan, supra note 70, at 105.
78See discussion infra Part IlI.B.
79See generally Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of TrademarkLaw, 51 UCLA L. REv. 621 (2004) (extensively

exploring the theoretical complexities of the relationship between a mark, a marked product, and the information
supposedly conveyed by the mark).
SOThe so-called "anonymous source doctrine," which dates back to Schechter's days, continues to be one of the more

awkward aspects of trademark law. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("[T]he
question is whether the buyers merely understood that the word 'Aspirin' meant this kind of drug, or whether it
meant that... it came from the same single, though ...anonymous, source from which they had got it before.").
The question whether the "anonymous source" is an earnest requirement of trademark protection or a legal fiction
created for the purpose of establishing a mark/maker nexus where none exists has led to doctrinal upheaval in the
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mental association by means of various proxy criteria which, in turn, suggest a
different and more generalized concern at the heart of trademark law.
A. Infringement
"[W]hether a claim [is] brought under [15 U.S.C.] § 1114 for infringement of
a registered mark, or whether it is brought under [15 U.S.C.] § 1125(a) for
infringement of an unregistered mark, the touchstone of the claim is likelihood of
confusion.'
Under the language of these statutes, a court deciding whether
infringement exists must determine whether it is likely that purchasers or potential
purchasers viewing the defendant's mark will either: (a) be confused into thinking
that the product bearing that mark originates with, or is sponsored or approved by,
the trademark owner; or (b) be confused into thinking that the defendant is
affiliated, connected, or associated with the trademark owner.82
1. Species of Confusion
"The most common and widely recognized type of confusion that creates
infringement is purchaser confusion of source which occurs at the time of purchase:
point of sale confusion."' 83 In other words, liability for infringement is usually
imposed where a defendant is using a trademark that causes consumers to believe
that plaintiff is the source of defendant's goods at the time of a purchase of
defendant's goods. However, other types of confusion are grounds for liability. As
has already been noted, confusion as to source is no more nor less actionable than
confusion as to affiliation, approval, sponsorship, or the like. Moreover, point-ofsale confusion is not the only scenario for which relief is available. A trademark
past, and remains open today. The Anti-Monopoly cases represent a confused set of decisions. See generally AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun
Group, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979). In response, Congress amended the Lanham Act to make the anonymous
source doctrine explicit. See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, sec. 103(l), 98 Stat. 3335,
3335 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006)) (defining "trademark" as "any word, name, symbol, or
device ... adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant.., to indicate the source of... goods, even ifthat
source is unknown" (emphasis added)). In that same statute, Congress made a tentative effort to loosen the grip of
the mark/maker relationship on one aspect of trademark doctrine, but this effort has been largely unsuccessful. See
id. sec. 102 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006)) (stating that a trademark may be "used as a name
of or to identify a unique product or service" without becoming generic); Beebe, supra note 79, at 652-53
(describing § 1064(3) as a less-than-successful attempt to force courts "to distinguish between marks that are
'distinctive of plaintiffs product' and marks that are 'distinctive of a product's source,"' while preserving
trademark protection over both classes of marks (emphasis added)).
81

ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 940 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression i, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004) (noting that a claim of
infringement "requires a showing that the defendant's actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of
consumers about the origin of the goods or services in question"); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy
Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831-32 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he touchstone test for a violation of § 43(a) is the likelihood
of confusion resulting from the defendant's adoption of a trade dress similar to the plaintiffs." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 23:1, at 23-6 to -9 ("Likelihood of confusion is the basic test of
both common law trademark infringement and federal statutory trademark infringement." (footnotes and internal
quotation marks omitted)).

82 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2006).
83

3

MCCARTHY,

supra note 13, § 23:5, at 23-20.
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owner can obtain relief for "initial-interest confusion"-a scenario in which a
consumer is attracted to a product due to confusion engendered by defendant's
mark, even though any such confusion is dispelled by the point-of-sale. 84 Post-sale
confusion, in which potential purchasers or the public at large are confused by
defendant's products when they are seen in the possession of prior purchasers, is
also actionable. 85 Finally, in some cases a second user of a trademark will
overwhelm the marketplace such that consumers erroneously believe that the goods
of the smaller first user-who by virtue of priority in time has rights to the
trademark-are those of the larger second user; this is known as "reverse
confusion. ' ' 86 It will become apparent over the rest of this article that these various
species of confusion are differentiated from one another (and from other species of
trademark liability) only by certain variations in the outcome of a limited set of
mental processes underlying all trademark liability.
2. DeterminingLikelihood of Confusion
No matter which of these scenarios is at issue, the relevant analysis remains
the same. The question of likelihood of confusion is generally determined by
means of an analysis derived from the 1938 Restatement of Torts, which set forth
nine factors to be considered.87 Although "each of the thirteen federal circuit
84 Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir. 1975); see

also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) (characterizing "bait and switch"
techniques as actionable under a theory of initial-interest confusion); Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841
F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing initial-interest confusion as a situation in which "potential
customers initially are attracted to the junior user's mark by virtue of its similarity to the senior user's mark, even
though these consumers are not actually confused at the time of purchase"); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum
Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (imposing liability where defendant's trademark "Pegasus" could
engender initial confusion with plaintiffs graphical flying-horse trademark, even if no such confusion existed at
the time defendant closed any transactions). But see Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423
F.3d 539, 549-52 & n.15 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2355 (2006) (rejecting initial-interest confusion
as a basis for infringement of a product shape trademark in the absence of point-of-sale confusion, and suggesting
that initial-interest confusion is largely limited to the context of internet domain names).
85 Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] loss occurs when a
sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the public as the genuine article, thereby confusing
the viewing public and achieving the status of owning the genuine article at a knockoff price."); Lois Sportswear,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The confusion the [Lanham] Act seeks
to prevent in [the post-sale] context is that a consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans
with appellee and that association will influence his buying decisions."); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v.
Vacheron & Constantin-Lecoultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (finding infringement where
"plaintiff copied the design of the Atmos clock because plaintiff intended to, and did, attract purchasers who
wanted a 'luxury design' clock[, and] some customers would buy plaintiffs cheaper clock for the purpose of
acquiring the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers' homes would regard as a
prestigious article"). But see Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 552 (rejecting post-sale confusion as a basis for
infringement of a product shape trademark in the absence of point-of-sale confusion).
86Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Reverse confusion occurs
when a large junior user saturates the market with a trademark similar or identical to that of a smaller, senior
user."); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490 (2nd Cir. 1988) ("Reverse confusion is the
misimpression that the junior user is the source of the senior user's goods.").
8 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 731 (1938); See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 24:29, at 24-55. The Tenth Circuit, in
a departure from this model, draws its likelihood of confusion factors from section 729 of the Restatement. Amoco
Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 558 n.5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729); Beer
Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729).
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courts of appeal has developed its own version of the list and each appears to be
jealous of its own formulation of factors," 88 the lists are all quite similar, as can be
seen in Table I on the following pages:

88 4 MCCARTHY,

supra note 13, § 24:30, at 24-57.
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89

FACTORS

CIRCUIT

First 90

Second 9'

Third

92

Fourth 93

1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
1)
2)
3)

Similarity of the marks
Similarity of the goods
Relationship between the parties' channels of trade
Relationship between the parties' advertising
Classes of prospective purchasers
Evidence of actual confusion
Defendant's intent in adopting its mark
Strength of the plaintiff's mark
Strength of plaintiff's mark
Degree of similarity between the marks
Proximity of the products
Likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap
Actual confusion
Defendant's good or bad faith
Quality of defendant's product
Sophistication of the buyers
Degree of similarity between the marks
Strength of plaintiff's mark
Price of the goods and other factors indicative of expected consumer
care and attention at point-of-sale
4) Length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual
confusion arising
Defendant's intent in adopting the mark
5)
6)
Evidence of actual confusion
7) Similarity of channels of trade and advertising media
8) Similarity of targets of the parties' sales efforts
9)
Relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers due to similarity
of function
10) Other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect
plaintiff to manufacture a product in the defendant's market, or that
plaintiff is likely to expand into that market
1) Strength or distinctiveness of the mark
2)
Similarity of the two marks
3) Similarity of the goods/services the marks identify
4)
Similarity of the facilities the parties use in their businesses
5)
Similarity of the advertising used by the parties
6)
Defendant's intent
7)
Actual confusion
8) Proximity of the products as they are actually sold
9)
Probability that the senior mark owner will "bridge the gap" by
entering the defendant's market
10) Quality of the defendant's product in relationship to the quality of
plaintiff's product
11)

Sophistication of the buyers

89 The D.C. Circuit has yet to announce the factors it deems relevant in determining likelihood of confusion.

4

McCarthy, supra note 13, § 24:42, at 24-73. The Federal Circuit's test, as articulated by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, only comes into play in proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office (such as registration
proceedings), and thus is not directly relevant to liability issues. Application of E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (setting forth thirteen-factor test for refusing registration based on likelihood
of confusion with the mark of a prior user).
90Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989).
9' Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar
Commc'ns, 244 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2001).
92Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983).
93Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1997) (listing all eleven factors); Pizzeria
Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (listing only the first seven factors).
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I)
Fifth"

Sixth95

Seventh

96

Eighth9 7

Ninth9 8

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Strength of the plaintiff's mark
Similarity of design between the marks
Similarity of the products
Identity of retail outlets and purchasers
Similarity of advertising media used
The defendant's intent
Actual confusion
Degree of care exercised by potential purchasers
Strength of the plaintiff's mark
Relatedness of the goods
Similarity of the marks
Evidence of actual confusion
Marketing channels used
Likely degree of purchaser care
Defendant's intent in selecting the mark
Likelihood of expansion of the product lines
Degree of similarity between the marks
Similarity of the products
Area and manner of concurrent use
Degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers
Strength of the plaintiff's mark
Actual confusion
Defendant's intent to palm off his products as those of another
Strength and distinctiveness of plaintiff's mark
Overall visual and aural similarity of the marks
Relatedness of products
Competitive proximity
Defendant's intent to pass off its goods as the product of another
Actual confusion
Degree of purchaser care in light of the kind, cost, and conditions of
purchase of the product
Strength of the mark
Proximity of the goods
Similarity of the marks
Evidence of actual confusion
Marketing channels used
Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser
Defendant's intent in selecting the mark
Likelihood of expansion of the product lines

94 Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803

F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975). The eighth factor is
mentioned only in Oreck, 803 F.2d at 170-71, which also substitutes "strength of plaintiffs mark" for the
reference in Roto-Rooter and PebbleBeach to the "type" of the mark, id., suggesting that "type" is merely another
word for mark strength as measured along the spectrum of distinctiveness set forth by Judge Friendly in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
95Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982).
96

Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v.
VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, 433 F.2d 686, 705 (2d Cir. 1970)).

97 SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Adver.

Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing SquirtCo, 628 F.2d at 1091).
9' AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Tenth

2)
3)
4)
1)
2)

Eleventh l003)

4)
5)
6)
7)
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Degree of similarity between the marks
Defendant's intent in adopting the mark
Similarity of use and manner of marketing between the parties'
products
Likely degree of purchaser care
Strength of plaintiff's mark
Similarity between the marks
Similarity between the products
Similarity of sales methods
Similarity of advertising methods
Defendant's intent
Actual confusion

The similarities among these circuit-specific lists should be apparent. Every
circuit includes factors regarding the similarity of the marks' 1 and the defendant's
intent. 10 2 All except the Tenth Circuit include factors regarding strength of the
plaintiff's mark 10 3 and evidence of actual confusion. 10 4 All except the Eleventh
Circuit (and to some extent the First Circuit) consider the sophistication of, or
05
degree of care likely to be exercised by, purchasers and prospective purchasers. 1
And all the remaining factors address in one way or another the proximity (or
overlap) of the commercial spheres in which the two parties' products are found:
either in similarity of the products themselves (along dimensions such as the
99Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 558 n.5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729
(1938)); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 729).
'00Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (1 th Cir. 1984).
101The factors dealing with similarity of the marks are: Factor 1 in the First Circuit, Factor 2 in the Second Circuit,
Factor 1 in the Third Circuit, Factor 2 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Sixth
Circuit, Factor 1 in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 2 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 1 in the
Tenth Circuit, and Factor 2 in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra tbl. 1.
102

The factors dealing with the defendant's intent are: Factor 7 in the First Circuit, Factor 6 in the Second Circuit,

Factor 5 in the Third Circuit, Factor 6 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 6 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 7 in the Sixth
Circuit, Factor 7 in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 5 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 7 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 2 in the
Tenth Circuit, and Factor 6 in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra tbl. 1.
103

Factors regarding the strength of the plaintiff's mark are: Factor 8 in the First Circuit, Factor I in the Second

Circuit, Factor 2 in the Third Circuit, Factor 1 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 1 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor I in the
Sixth Circuit, Factor 5 in the Seventh Circuit, Factor I in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 1 in the Ninth Circuit, and
Factor I in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra tbl. 1.
104Evidence of actual confusion factors are: Factor 6 in the First Circuit, Factor 5 in the Second Circuit, Factors 4 and

6 in the Third Circuit, Factor 7 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 7 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 4 in the Sixth Circuit,
Factor 6 in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 6 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 4 in the Ninth Circuit, and Factor 7 in the
Eleventh Circuit. See supra tbl. 1. The Tenth Circuit's departure from its sister circuits on mark strength and
actual confusion is likely attributable to the fact that it based its list on section 729 of the Restatement of Torts,
while the other circuits derived their tests from section 73 1. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105

Factors relating to the sophistication of purchasers are: Factor 8 in the Second Circuit, Factor 3 in the Third

Circuit, Factor 11 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 8 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 6 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 4 in the
Seventh Circuit, Factor 7 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 6 in the Ninth Circuit, and Factor 4 in the Tenth Circuit. See
supra tbl. 1. Factor 5 in the First Circuit addresses "classes of prospective purchasers," but this factor is grouped
with other factors relating to the overlap in the parties' markets, specifically whether they are likely to share a
substantial amount of customers. Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1989). The court has
said that the relative expertise of the relevant classes of customers is sometimes, but not always, relevant to
likelihood of confusion. Id.
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function of the goods or their relative quality or cost), 10 6 similarity of the
commercial or geographic contexts of their sale (including the venues in which they
are sold and the likelihood that the plaintiff will expand the scope of its business to
overlap with that of the defendant), 107 similarity of their target audiences,' 0 8 or
similarity of the techniques and media used to advertise and market them.' 0 9
Collectively, these factors can be understood as addressing whether consumers are
likely to encounter both parties' products (and, hence, their marks) in a similar
commercial context, and this article will use the term "proximity of markets" as a
shorthand for the various comparisons in this subset of the likelihood of confusion
test.
All the various tests for likelihood of confusion-whether comprising four
factors or eleven-boil down to the six essential concerns described in the previous
paragraph: actual confusion, strength of plaintiffs mark, similarity of marks,
proximity of markets, degree of consumer care, and defendant's intent. All these
factors purport to measure the likelihood of consumer confusion as to source,
affiliation, approval, or the like; but in fact, only one factor actually attempts to take
The
the measurement directly: the "evidence of actual confusion" factor.
remaining factors can be understood as proxy measurements: accessible facts that
are believed to have some relevant relationship to the attribute that is the target of
inquiry, and are therefore expected to have predictive power as to the value of that
target attribute. Although the likelihood of confusion test is ostensibly concerned
with the consumer's perception of the relationship between mark and maker, most
of the test's proxy measurements are grounded in the circumstances of the
consumer's direct interaction with the trademarks in question and the products to
which they are attached, without regard to the concept of a mark owner: whether
the marks are similar to one another, encountered on similar products, or
encountered in similar contexts; whether they are unique or well known; and
whether the consumer will give care and thought to the purchase decision in which
the trademark is encountered. The one exception to the generalization that proxy
measurements of likelihood of confusion are independent of the concept of a
manufacturer-defendant's intent-is a relic of the equitable origins of unfair
Factor 2 in the First Circuit, Factors 3 and 7 in the Second Circuit, Factor 9 in the Third Circuit, Factors 3 and 10

'06

in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Seventh Circuit,
Factor 3 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Ninth Circuit, and Factor 3 in the Eleventh Circuit all speak to this
issue. See supra tbl. 1. The Tenth Circuit also considers product similarity to some extent, under the rubric of its
Factor 3. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Confising similarity is
most likely when the products themselves are very similar.").
Factors relating to the commercial or geographic context of sale are: Factor 3 in the First Circuit; Factors 3 and 4
in the Second Circuit; Factors 7 and 10 in the Third Circuit; Factors 4, 8, and 9 in the Fourth Circuit; Factor 4 in
the Fifth Circuit; Factor 3 in the Seventh Circuit; Factor 4 in the Eighth Circuit; Factors 2, 5, and 8 in the Ninth
Circuit; Factor 3 in the Tenth Circuit; and Factor 4 in the Eleventh Circuit. See supra tbl. 1.
'08Factors dealing with the similarities of the target audiences are: Factor 5 in the First Circuit and Factor 8 in the
107

Third Circuit. See supra tbl. 1.
'0"Factor 4 in the First Circuit, Factor 7 in the Third Circuit, Factor 5 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 5 in the Fifth

Circuit, Factor 5 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 5 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Tenth Circuit, and Factor 5 in the
Eleventh Circuit all speak to this issue. See supratbl. 1.
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competition law, but has lately been largely marginalized by the courts precisely
0
because it is not believed to bear a sufficient relationship to consumer confusion."
In fact, recent cases suggest that the defendant's intent may be nothing more than
an inferential link between similarity of marks and likelihood of confusion."' This
link is part of a well-worn chain of reasoning: if a defendant knew of the plaintiffs
mark, and adopted a similar or identical mark, he must have thought he would
confuse consumers and thereby capitalize on plaintiff's goodwill, and he is likely to
have succeeded in his efforts to confuse."12 In this view, the defendant's intent is
less of a proxy measurement in its own right than a gloss on the similarity-of-marks
inquiry, 113 and in fact it can even be viewed as a logically circular effort to justify
the use of similarity of marks as a proxy for likelihood of confusion. In light of
these features of the treatment of defendant's intent under trademark law, this
article will treat defendant's intent as an offshoot of the similarity-of-marks inquiry
and will not address the former factor independently. "14
In sum, this section has attempted to reduce the various infringement tests to
four primal factors that serve as proxies for likelihood of confusion in judicial
analysis under the Lanham Act: similarity of marks, proximity of markets, strength
of marks, and consumer care. As the next part will demonstrate, courts' use of
these proxies to determine likelihood of confusion is something of an inversion; the
proxy factors are actually more direct measurements of the harm at issue in
trademark cases than is consumer confusion as to source, affiliation, approval, or
the like. As will be made clear below, consumer confusion as to the relationship
between manufacturers and trademarked products is simply a convenient

110
See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (The defendant's intent is not "of high
relevance" because "[ilt does not bear directly on whether customers are likely to be confused."); Brookfield
Commc'ns v. W. Coast Entn't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1999) (The defendant's intent "is only relevant
to the extent that it bears upon the likelihood that consumers will be confused by the alleged infringer's mark (or to
the extent that a court wishes to consider it as an equitable consideration)."); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50
F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A] defendant's intent weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion
only.., where the product's labeling and marketing are also affirmatively misleading.").
See supra note 110.
See, e.g., Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 206 ("[T]here is little or no competitive need to copy another's distinctive
symbol or presentation to sell one's product, and... anyone who does so is most likely trying to cash in on the
competitor's goodwill .... ); Am. Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1953)
(Learned Hand, J.) ("[A]s soon as we see that a second comer ... plagiarized the make-up of an earlier comer, we
need no more; for he at any rate thinks ... that he is likely to succeed [in sowing confusion]." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
13 See Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 206 (holding that reliance on defendant's intent "largely duplicates the weight given
112

to the substantial-identity-of-appearance factor ... in the likelihood of confusion inquiry").
Despite courts' avowed program to accord little weight to a defendant's intent, recent empirical analysis suggests

114

that judges rely very heavily on this factor when deciding trademark cases. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of
the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 1626-31 (2006) (discussing data showing
that a finding against the defendant on the intent factor correlates almost perfectly to a finding against the
defendant on the issue of liability). Given the circular reasoning behind the use of this factor as a determinant of
liability, and the courts' voluble disavowal of it, the empirical result of Professor Beebe's analysis suggests that
judicial discretion in trademark cases may require more stringent channeling. See infra notes 241-44 and
accompanying text.
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framework for rationally discussing this harm, which is not amenable to the
deductive, rationalist framework of judicial analysis.11 5
B. Dilution
The federal dilution statute, as amended, makes remedies available to the
"owner of a famous mark" against another person's commercial use of a mark that
"is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark." ' 16 As will be demonstrated, the similarity of "fame" in dilution doctrine to
"strength" in infringement doctrine suggests the first affinity between the two
remedies, with the distinction that strength of the plaintiffs mark is a necessary
statutory element of a prima facie dilution case,1 17 not merely a factor in weighing
the relative strength of a claim (as it is for infringement). Whether a dilution claim
will actually succeed depends on other factors set forth in the statute, and these
factors also share affinities with those developed by courts in the infringement
context. This section will first examine the relationship between mark strength and
fame, then go on to discuss the other factors used to test for the two species of
dilution (i.e., blurring and tamishment) and the relationship between those factors
and the previously identified factors for determining infringement.
1. Strength and Fame
The mark strength factor in infringement doctrine incorporates two legal
concepts: inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness (also known as
secondary meaning). 118 Inherent distinctiveness is a judgment about the uniqueness
of a trademark in the context of the category of goods on which it is used. Terms
that refer to the genus of which a particular product is a species (such as "car" and
"cola") are "generic," and are therefore not entitled to trademark protection.119 At
the other end of the distinctiveness spectrum are "arbitrary" words that bear no
logical relationship to the products to which they are affixed (such as "Camel" for
cigarettes or "Apple" for computers), and "fanciful" words that have been coined

115See discussion infra Part IV.

116Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(1), 120 Stat. 1730,
1730 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
117 See

11

id. sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(A), 120 Stat. at 1730-31.

Courts rely on concepts of distinctiveness not only in determining liability, but also in determining whether a
trademark is entitled to protection in the first place. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769
(1992) ("The general rule regarding distinctiveness is clear: An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being
protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning."
(emphasis omitted)). For purposes of this article, however, the relevance of these concepts lies in their effect on

determinations of liability for a defendant's use, not in their effect on the protectability of a plaintiff's mark.
"9 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).

Terms that may once have

signified a particular manufacturer's product but have come, over time, to refer to an entire category of productssuch as "aspirin," "cellophane," and "thermos"-are also considered generic. Id. at 10 (citing Bayer Co. v. United
Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (2d Cir. 1921); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936);
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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specifically for trademark use (such as "Kodak" or "Xerox"). 120 Such terms are
entitled to vigorous trademark protection. 121 Between these extremes are
"descriptive" marks-terms that describe the products to which they are affixed
(such as "Tasty" for food products or "Bright" for flashlights)-and "suggestive"
marks-terms that suggest a conclusion about the nature of the goods to which they
are affixed but require some thought to reach that conclusion (such as "Tide" for
laundry detergent or "Coppertone" for suntan lotion).' 22 Suggestive marks are
generally afforded protection, although they are not considered as strong as
arbitrary or fanciful marks. 123 In contrast, descriptive marks are even weaker and
are entitled to protection only upon a showing of acquired
distinctiveness or
24
secondary meaning, the second metric of mark strength. 1
The Supreme Court has held that a trademark has attained secondary meaning
when "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of [the mark] is to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.' ' 125 This is yet
another example of the doctrinal preoccupation with the nexus of mark and maker.
In addition to direct evidence of such a nexus in the minds of the public (such as
testimony or consumer surveys), courts trying to determine whether a mark has
attained secondary meaning consider a variety of proxy factors such as the length
and exclusivity of the plaintiffs use of the mark, the plaintiffs advertising efforts,
publicity surrounding
the mark, and the sales success of the plaintiffs products
26
bearing the mark. 1
Dilution doctrine's version of mark strength-fame-is closely related to the
other metrics. The text of the TDRA sets forth various factors for determining
fame, 127 which essentially incorporate the factors used to assess the other forms of
mark strength. For example, the TDRA considers the scope of a mark's advertising
and the sales of goods bearing that mark as evidence of fame; both factors are also

12 0

Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 & n.12.

121See,

e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he law accords broad, muscular

protection to marks that are arbitrary or fanciful in relation to the products on which they are used.").
22 Abercrombie,537
123

F.2d at 10-11.

Id.

124id.
125Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,

Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)). The Court continues to invoke this definition of secondary meaning despite
an apparent effort by Congress to refine the formulation, at least insofar as it pertains to the doctrine of
genericness. See supra note 80.
126 See,

e.g., Centaur Commc'ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc'ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987); Mktg.

Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 23
(2001); Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1985); Pebble
Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 998 n.12 (7th Cir. 1989).
27 Trademark

Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(A), 120 Stat. 1730,

1730-31 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
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used in the acquired distinctiveness inquiry. 2 8 The third fame factor-"extent of
actual recognition of the mark"129-is related to the publicity factor for determining
acquired distinctiveness, and may indeed amount to the same inquiry in different
words. And the final factor in determining fame-whether a mark has been
registered-incorporates the inherent and acquired distinctiveness criteria for
registration. 130 While courts are likely to require a heightened showing under these
factors to support a finding of fame, '31 and may even expand this list of factors, the
difference between fame in dilution doctrine and mark strength in infringement
doctrine appears to be one of degree, rather than kind.
2. Dilution by Blurring
The factors for assessing the merits of a blurring claim are almost identical to
those used to analyze infringement claims. The TDRA sets out a nonexclusive list
of six factors for "determining whether a mark ...is likely to cause dilution by
blurring," 3 2 half of which merely restate various measurements of mark strength or
fame. 133 Two additional factors establish the relevance of subjective and objective
assessments of the existence of the mental association between an accused mark
and a plaintiffs mark that is the sine qua non of dilution under the TDRA,
affirming that the purpose of dilution doctrine is to deter the same sort of freeriding that is at issue in infringement cases. 134 The remaining factor simply states
that "[t]he degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark" is relevant to the likelihood of blurring analysis, 135 as of course it is in
infringement analysis. In short, the only distinction between the test for blurring
and the test for infringement is that the former elides factors such as market
proximity and consumer care in favor of a broader and more vague search for
actual and intended associations between two marks. Given the lack of any clearly
distinguishing characteristics of blurring vis-A-vis infringement, it is quite probable
128Compare id.

with Centaur Commc'ns, 830 F.2d at 1222, Mktg. Displays, 200 F.3d at 937, Co-Rect Prods., 780

F.2d at 1332-33, PebbleBeach, 155 F.3d at 541, and G. Heileman Brewing Co., 873 F.2d at 998 n. 12.
29

1 TDRA, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(A)(iii), 120 Stat. at 1730-31.
130

15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f) (2006) (permitting the PTO to refuse registration of a mark that is merely descriptive

absent a showing that the mark "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce").
131
See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that, to qualify as famous under

the pre-TDRA federal dilution statute, a mark must possess "a high degree of... acquired distinctiveness"
(quoting TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted)).
132TDRA, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(B), 120 Stat. at 1731.
133Trademark

Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, sec. 2(l), § 43(c)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv), 120
Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) (listing degree of inherent or acquired
distinctiveness, degree of the plaintiff's substantially exclusive use, and degree of recognition of the mark as
factors in determining likelihood of blurring).
id. sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(B)(v)-(vi) (listing the intent to create an association with a famous mark and the
actual existence of such associations as factors in determining likelihood of blurring); see also supra notes 59, 6877 and accompanying text.

134See

3 TDRA, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(B)(i), 120 Stat. at 1731.
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that the associations that supposedly lead to blurring are no more than the genus of
which confusion is a species, and at least possible that the two mental states are in
fact identical. As two leading trademark scholars have stated, "[B]lurring often
looks too much like a second shot at proving likelihood of confusion under a
looking] like little more than
slightly different verbal formulation . . . [and
36
job."1
paint
different
a
with
analysis
confusion
3. Dilution by Tarnishment
The TDRA provides no list of factors for determining likelihood of
tarnishment as it does for likelihood of blurring, stating only that tamishment is
"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark."' 137 Nevertheless, this
definition in itself provides at least three criteria that will likely be relevant to
assessing a tarnishment claim: fame (i.e., strength) of the plaintiffs mark, similarity
between the plaintiffs mark and the accused mark, and the existence of a mental
association between the accused mark and the plaintiff's mark. In other words, a
tarnishment claim will rise or fall on essentially the same factors as a blurring claim
or an infringement claim, and it suffers from the same circular construction. The
one distinguishing characteristic of tarnishment claims is that the association in
question must be one that harms the reputation of the plaintiffs mark.' 38 In this
vein, courts considering claims under the pre-TDRA federal statute or state dilution
statutes have historically held that the defendant's use must somehow involve
shoddy goods or unsavory activity to be actionable under a tarnishment theory; the
uses of famous marks in contexts that
most typical examples involve commercial
139
suggest sexual activity or drug use.
The near-total overlap between the factors relevant to the two species of
dilution claims suggests a conceptual affinity between the doctrines of blurring and
tarnishment: where the latter seeks to prevent persons other than the trademark
owner from creating negative associations with the owner's mark, the former seeks
to prevent persons other than the trademark owner from creating any associations
with the mark that would compete with the associations created by its owner. As
136

Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST

IMPRESSIONS 98, 100 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll05/dinwoodie.pdf.

TDRA, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(C), 120 Stat. at 1731.

'37

138
Id.
139
See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with the district court

that defendant's inventory of adult videos, sex toys, and other adult novelties was sufficient to support a
tamishment claim), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 949-50 (N.D. II. 2002) (holding that the use of the names "VelVeeda" and "King Velveeda" on a
website of sexually explicit images and references to drug use tarnished the "Velveeta" trademark); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1479, 1480 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding the plaintiff was likely to
prove that the internet domain address "candyland.com" on an adult website tarnished the "CANDY LAND" board
game trademark); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding
under the New York dilution statute that the "Coca-Cola" mark was diluted by defendant's modification of a CocaCola advertisement in a poster that altered the text to read "Cocaine").
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will be shown in Parts IV and V below, these related policies are in turn connected
to the anti-confusion policy of infringement law, and juxtaposition of the
doctrines-including the proxy factors by which they are analyzed-suggests a
more generalized theory of trademark law rooted in the cognitive psychology of
consumer behavior.
C. Summary
This part has identified a limited set of factors that inform the analysis of all
trademark claims. Whether a claim is brought for infringement, blurring, or
tarnishment, the strength of the plaintiffs mark, and the similarity of the
defendant's mark to the plaintiffs mark will always be a factor in deciding the
claim. For tarnishment claims, there is an added requirement that the defendant's
use threatens to generate a negative association with the plaintiff's mark. For
infringement claims, courts will also consider the proximity of the markets in which
the parties' marks appear and the likely degree of consumer care-factors that may
well be subsumed in the association inquiry of blurring and tarnishment claims.
The fact that the three legal standards for federal trademark claims-likelihood of
confusion for infringement, associations that impair the distinctiveness of the
plaintiffs mark for dilution by blurring, and associations that harm the reputation
of the plaintiffs mark for dilution by tamishment-are all determined by analyzing
this limited and overlapping set of proxy factors suggests a deep connection
between the various species of liability. Indeed, as the next part will show, the
current legal regime is something of an inversion: the proxy factors are directly
linked to the harms at issue in trademark cases, and the diverging legal standards
governing the various species of liability are best understood as rationalist efforts to
discuss these harms, which operate at a decidedly non-rational level.
IV. The Cognitive Psychology of Trademarks and Consumer Decision-Making
Although the doctrines of infringement and dilution have developed
separately, and indeed often in tension with one another, if one examines them in
the abstract it becomes apparent that they are really flip sides of the same coin. The
doctrines discussed in the previous part are all centrally concerned with a specific
cognitive process, i.e., the effect of the sensory stimulus of a trademark on the
mental processes of actual or potential consumers. This effect can be understood as
an interconnected set of heuristics and related idiosyncrasies of human memory,
cognition, and decision-making. While trademark doctrine ostensibly concerns
itself with the consumer's perception of the relationship between trademarked
products and their manufacturers, we have seen that Congress and the courts tend
not to concern themselves as much with this relationship as with a fairly narrow set
of proxy criteria. This part will demonstrate that doctrinal constructs such as
likelihood of confusion, associations that impair a mark's distinctiveness, and
associations that harm the reputation of a mark-insofar as they purport to address
the effect of a trademark on a consumer's belief as to the relationship between mark
and maker, rather than consumer reaction to the mark itself-are merely rationally
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cognizable proxies for the manipulations to which the non-rational cognitive
processes triggered by trademarks are particularly susceptible.
As an introduction to this hypothesis, readers may wish to perform a brief selfassessment as follows: Typically, when I see a can with the words "Coca-Cola"
emblazoned on it in white script against a red background, do I run through a linear
mental process on the order of: "That logo is a trademark of the Coca-Cola
Company, whose products I have used in the past and found to be (un)satisfactory
and (un)pleasant; therefore this product which bears the same logo must also be a
product of the Coca-Cola Company (or otherwise affiliated with or approved by
that company); and because that company is likely to strive for consistency across
the products to which it affixes its trademark, this product is likely to be
(un)satisfactory and (un)pleasant to me"? Or rather, when confronted with such a
stimulus, does a general impression of (un)pleasantness and (un)desirability simply
present itself in my consciousness through no deliberate mental effort on my part?
For readers who have the former reaction (if any such readers exist), the arguments
presented herein will likely be unpersuasive. But for readers who have the latter
reaction, this part will suggest an explanation why.
Let us begin with the unremarkable assumption that a consumer facing a
purchase decision will select a purchase option that she believes is most likely to
satisfy her needs or wants. The specific needs or wants at issue are not particularly
material for present purposes. They could include such disparate criteria as value
for the dollar; suitability for a specific purpose; capacity to provide some sort of
physical, psychological, or emotional enjoyment; or even social prestige or
distinction. How is our hypothetical consumer to determine which particular
product from among all her choices is most likely to satisfy her needs or wants?
She will usually not be permitted to sample or test the various products, and will
thus lack direct evidence from which to rationally deduce their relative capacity to
satisfy her criteria. When faced with such uncertainty, human beings tend to
estimate the attribute they are trying to measure (the target attribute, in this case,
the criteria our hypothetical consumer deems important) by reference to a related
attribute (a substitute attribute) that they feel they can measure. 140 These substitute
attributes are often determined by means of heuristics. 141 And in the case of our
hypothetical consumer, there are obvious stimuli available to trigger and channel
her heuristic judgments-trademarks. 142
140 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive
Judgment, in

PSYCHOLOGY

OF

INTUITIVE

JUDGMENT,

supra

note

9,

at

49,

53-56,

available at

http://www.mit.edu/people/shanefre/RepRevisited.pdf.
141See id. at 53-56.

This is not to say that consumers will always base their purchasing decisions solely on their response to a
trademark. Other factors, such as price, will come into play. But insofar as trademark law is concerned with the
effects of trademarks on consumer beliefs and behavior, the discussion herein will focus on those effects to the
exclusion of other potential influences. In this respect consumer reaction to trademarks is closely related, albeit not
identical, to the marketing concept of "brand equity," defined as "the differential effect of brand knowledge on
consumer response to the marketing of the brand." Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and

142

ManagingCustomer-BasedBrand Equity, 57 J. MARKETING 1,2 (Jan. 1993).
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Courts dealing with trademark cases and legislators dealing with the legacy of
those cases have developed and applied the proxy factors discussed in the previous
part as metrics for the proper boundaries of trademark liability, even though those
proxy factors do not speak directly to the ostensible subject of trademark
doctrine-consumer perceptions of the relationship between a marked product and
the mark owner. This disconnect suggests that the proxy factors may play some
role in the cognitive processes triggered by a trademark; the cognitive processes, in
turn, reflect some feature of consumer psychology other than a belief as to the
relationship between a marked product and a manufacturer. Viewing the proxy
factors through the lens of cognitive psychology, some potential reasons why courts
and legislators may consider them important begin to emerge. Each of these
proxies-similarity of marks, proximity of markets, strength of marks, degree of
consumer care, and negative associations-can be understood as reflecting nonrational features of human cognition, which influence consumer decision-making in
predictable ways. Taken together, these cognitive processes suggest a structure
within which certain market behaviors will generate an improperly biased
consumer response to a trademark-a response that is the product of empirically
unlikely or erroneous consumer beliefs. It is these undesirable responses, and the
purchase decisions they cause, that trademark law seeks to prevent by imposing
liability against the market behaviors that generate them.
A. Substitution of Attributes and Negative Associations: The Affect
Heuristic and Choosing by Liking
The discussion above implies the existence of substitute attributes that inform
consumer choice in the absence of information to guide rational decision-making.
143
A likely candidate for generating such a substitute attribute is the affect heuristic.
Based on a variety of experimental studies, psychology researchers have concluded
that choices and judgments are often made based on automatically generated
valences of positive or negative affective responses-emotional states experienced
as a sense of goodness or badness concerning a given stimulus.144 Put simply, we
choose what we like, and only after we have decided do we retroactively try to
rationalize our decision. 145 It is hypothesized that the emotional component of our
143

Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 140, at 57 ("Affective valence is a natural assessment, and therefore a

candidate for substitution in the numerous situations in which an affectively loaded response is required."); see Jon
D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 732 (1999) ("[O]ur affective responses to products more often than not determine the
purchasing decision, regardless of whether we experience the decision as having resulted from 'reasons."').
'44 See Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 9, at
548, 553 (describing the use of this heuristic as a means of generating choices without deliberate reasoning); Paul
Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 9, at 397 (describing the affect heuristic and the empirical data from which it is
inferred).
See Frederick, supra note 144, at 550 (describing the affect heuristic as "choosing by liking"); see also R. B.
Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151, 155 (1980) ("Quite
often 'I decided in favor of X' is no more than 'I liked X.' . . We buy the cars we 'like,' choose the jobs and
houses that we find 'attractive,' and then justify those choices by various reasons .... ).

145
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experiences with a given stimulus tags that stimulus with affective content, either
consciously or unconsciously, and the pool of these affective tags is automatically
drawn on whenever that stimulus is encountered again. 146 For example, drinking a
cold beverage on a hot day, getting a product recall notice, seeing an aesthetically
pleasing advertisement, or reading a news report that a household product contains
a potent carcinogen are all experiences that would modify the affect pool for the
products and trademarks involved 47 and would accordingly make a consumer more
or less likely to choose products bearing the implicated trademarks.
How can we be confident that our hypothetical consumer will rely on an
intuitive sense of affect rather than a more structured reasoning process in making
her purchase decision? Experimental data suggest the existence of two parallel
systems of human reasoning-one automatic and associative and the other
deliberate and rule-based-that work simultaneously and interactively to complete
cognitive tasks. 148 From what we know about human cognition, associative (as
opposed to linear or logical) judgments such as affective response are often
150
automatic, 49 and "tagging" a stimulus with affect is an extraordinarily easy task.
Moreover, such judgments are difficult to displace with subsequent logical

146

See Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 144, at 400; see also Tim Ambler et al., Salience and

Choice: Neural Correlates of Shopping Decisions, 21 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 247, 256 (2004) (discussing neural
activation patterns during consumer choice tasks that suggest the visual stimuli of trademarks trigger "semantic
processing and the memory-based interpretation of visually presented material," and that "such memories are
complex with episodic and, in many cases, affective and cognitive elements ... [and] probably involve actual
experience of purchasing, usage, or seeing advertisements.").
147See Ambler et al., supra note 146, at 256. Research has shown that people tend to believe intuitively that there is
an inverse correlation between risk and benefit; positive affective feelings can lead a person to underestimate the
risk of the stimulus that generates such feelings, while awareness of even small risks can result in outsized
reductions in the perceived benefits of the source of that risk. Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note
144, at 410-14. Professors Hanson and Kysar have noted that this feature of human decision-making leads
inevitably to manipulative market behavior in the form of affect-laden advertising for risky products such as
cigarettes. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143, at 732-33.
148Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems ofReasoning, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 9, at 379-84.
For example, Sloman points to experimental results that show test subjects simultaneously believing two
contradictory responses to a test question--one founded on associative judgments of similarity and the other on
logical rules of probability-as evidence of the two-systems theory. Id. at 385-91; see generally Ulrike Hahn &
Nick Chater, Similarity and Rules: Distinct? Exhaustive? Empirically Distinguishable?, 65 COGNITION 197 (1998)
(discussing theoretical and empirical distinctions between rule-based and similarity-based cognitive processes).
...See Sloman, supra note 148, at 379, 380-84 & tbl. 22.1, 393-94 (arguing that "associative" reasoning, which
governs associative memory functions, is an automatic form of cognitive processing, to be distinguished from
"rule-based" reasoning, which governs more formal logical analysis and requires deliberate sequential processing).
But see Gerd Gigerenzer & Terry Regier, How Do We Tell an Association From a Rule? Comment on Sloman
(1996), 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 23 (1996) (critiquing Sloman's dual-system theory on grounds of ambiguity,
vagueness, and failure to consider alternative explanations of data).
150As an illustration of our unconscious susceptibility to affective content, consider a study that showed that flashing

an affectively charged image (a smiling or frowning face) for 1/250th of a second immediately prior to the display
of a stimulus was enough to bias the test subject's preference for that stimulus, even though the affectively charged
"priming" cue was so brief that there was no recognition or recall of it. Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor,
supra note 144, at 401 (citing P. Winkielman, R.B. Zajonc, & N. Schwarz, Subliminal Affective Priming Resists
Attributional Interventions, 11 COGNITION & EMOTION 433 (1997)). This effect persisted even when the stimulus
was later presented with an affectively opposite "priming" cue. Id.
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reasoning, which is cognitively demanding and slow. 151 Experimental data have
also shown that the affect heuristic is persistent: once a stimulus has been tagged
with affective value, later contrary information about the stimulus's actual meaning
or significance will often be insufficient to significantly alter the affective
response.15 2 Indeed, when we rely on any heuristic judgment in our decisionmaking, it takes considerable time and effort to alter those judgments based on
further, more rational consideration, if we can alter them at all.1 53 Put simply,
"[P]eople are not accustomed to thinking hard, and are often content to trust a
plausible judgment that quickly comes to mind,' ' 54 Thus, particularly in those
purchasing contexts where the purchase is not considered for a long period of
time, 55 initial intuitive judgments-such as affective reactions to a trademark-are
extremely likely to form the sole basis for the ultimate purchasing decision.
Consumer psychologists studying the purchasing decision have reached similar
conclusions. 116
The influence of affect and the related phenomenon of "choosing by liking" on
purchase decisions begins to shed light on some of the proxy factors identified in
the previous part. First of all, trademark liability can begin to be understood as a
system of regulation for one of the channels by which affective content is created:
the application of words and symbols to products. 5 7 Moreover, the relevance of
See discussion infra Parts IV.C.3, IV.D.

'5'

.52
For example, in one experiment test subjects were given an affectively charged definition for Chinese pictograms,
then told that those definitions were inaccurate and asked to memorize "accurate" affectively neutral definitions for
the same pictograms. Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 144, at 401. Even after the new
affectively neutral meanings had been learned, the test subjects continued to exhibit the earlier affective reaction to
the pictograms. Id.
153See

Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143, at 646-54 (discussing a host of empirically demonstrated phenomena

illustrating the general principle that initial judgments are extremely persistent, even in the face of contradictory or
ambiguous hard data). Surprisingly, attempts at rationalization may actually serve to increase confidence in a
faulty intuitive judgment, a phenomenon known as confirmation bias. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143, at
647-50, 660-62; Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the
Adjustments are Insufficient, 17 Psychol. Science 311, 312 (2006) ("[P]eople evaluate hypotheses by trying to
confirm them."). For a general overview of the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of the confirmatory bias,
see Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143, at 647-50.
14

Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 140, at 57 ("[P]eople initially believe whatever they are told....

[l]t takes

some time and mental effort to 'unbelieve' such dubious statements."). Cf.generally Christian D. Schunn et al., To
Calculate or Not to Calculate. A Source Activation Confusion Model of Problem Familiarity's Role in Strategy
Selection, 23 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 3 (1997) (demonstrating that
people tend to retrieve answers to problems from memory, rather than calculate them through logical reasoning
when the problem appears familiar to them).
'55
See discussion infra Parts IV.C.3, IV.D.
156See generally, e.g., Girish N. Punj & Clayton L. Hillyer, A Cognitive Model of Customer-Based Brand Equityfor

Frequently PurchasedProducts: Conceptual Framework and EmpiricalResults, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 124
(2004) (formulating and empirically testing a model of brand equity that is dominated by affectively-laden "global
brand attitude" and "brand heuristic" as first- and second-level determinants, respectively, of consumer decisionmaking); Ambler et al., supra note 146, at 248 (summarizing research suggesting that emotion and feelings are the
primary drivers of consumer decision-making). But see id. at 257 (noting that brain imaging neither supported nor
refuted neurophysiological predictions of one theorist of emotion-based choice).
157Of course, as noted above, there are numerous other avenues for the creation of affective associations, not all of

which are regulated by trademark law and some of which are not regulated at all. See supra notes 143-47 and
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negative associations to claims for dilution by tarnishment becomes clear. By
altering the affect pool for a given trademark, uses that generate negative
associations lessen the chance that consumers will choose products bearing that
trademark. The choosing-by-liking model also suggests roles for the proxy factors
dealing with mark strength and consumer care, which are discussed below.
B. Mark Strength: Recognition, Recall, and Familiarity
As discussed above, 158 when courts talk about the strength of a plaintiffs
trademark, they are referring to three related legal concepts: inherent
distinctiveness, acquired distinctiveness (also known as secondary meaning), and
fame. 159 Each plays a different role in the behavioralist model of trademark
liability.
1. Inherent Distinctiveness and the Recognition Heuristic
As will be discussed in the next part, the most compelling explanation for the
law's privileging of unique marks arises from concern over the competitiveness of
the market rather than over the thought processes of consumers. 160 Nevertheless,
inherent distinctiveness may also correlate to some features of human memory and
decision-making. Much research on human memory has focused on the distinction
between two specific and, interestingly, independent memory tasks: recognition and
recall. 16' Recognition is described as the belief that one has encountered a stimulus
in the past, whereas recall is the ability to retrieve the stimulus and contextual
information about it from memory when given an appropriate cue. 162 The first
accompanying text. As will be discussed below, the behavioralist model set forth herein implies an inconsistency
between the relatively strict regulation of trademark uses and the more permissive or absent regulation of other
avenues for affective content, but a full exploration of those implications is beyond the scope of this article. See
infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
158See supra Part III.B.1.

Courts rely on concepts of distinctiveness not only in determining liability, but also in determining whether a
trademark is entitled to protection in the first place. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769
(1992) ("The general rule regarding distinctiveness is clear: An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being
protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning."
(emphasis added)). For purposes of this article, however, the relevance of these concepts lies in their effect on
determinations of liability for a defendant's use, not their effect on the legitimacy of a plaintiff's mark.

'59

160See discussion infra Part V.B.
161See, e.g., Gordon H. Bower, A Brief History of Memory Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEMORY 3,

16-19 (Endel Tulving & Fergus I.M. Craik eds., 2000) (discussing features of memory that have been the focus of
recent study, including free recall, frequency, and recognition).
162In the context of consumer psychology, the distinction and its relevance to marketing strategy have been described
as follows:
Brand recognition relates to consumers' ability to confirm prior exposure to the brand when given the brand as a cue.
In other words, brand recognition requires that consumers correctly discriminate the brand as having been seen or
heard previously. Brand recall relates to consumers' ability to retrieve the brand when given the product category,
the needs fulfilled by the category, or some other type of probe as a cue. In other words, brand recall requires that
consumers correctly generate the brand from memory. The relative importance of brand recall and recognition
depends on the extent to which consumers make decisions in the store (where they potentially may be exposed to
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measure of mark strength, uniqueness, may be related to an interesting
distinguishing feature of recognition and recall. Studies have found that lowfrequency words-those uncommon in ordinary usage-are more easily recognized
when encountered after an initial exposure than are high-frequency words.' 63 The
word-frequency effect on recall is precisely the opposite, but less stable; when
presented with lists of either all high-frequency or all low-frequency words, people
tend to more accurately recall high-frequency words.1 64 This effect all but
disappears when both high-frequency and low-frequency words are presented in a
mixed list. 165 To the degree that high-frequency words correlate with generic terms
(which admittedly may not be a very high degree), the judicially-developed concept
of inherent distinctiveness may reflect this feature of human memory. 166 Thus, one
reason the law may be more protective of unique marks is that-absent any other
measure of consumer reaction to a trademark-such marks, once encountered, may
more likely be recognized than non-unique marks, and thus no less likely to be
recalled than non-unique
marks when presented in the same context as such non167
unique marks.
Although the word frequency effect gives some general insight into the
potential relevance of recognition to inherent distinctiveness, it does not explain
how a recognition-based theory of inherent distinctiveness might play a role in
consumer decision-making. That gap can be filled by a feature of human cognition
known as the recognition heuristic, which has been described as follows:
Consider the task of inferring which of two objects has a higher value on some criterion
(e.g., which is faster, higher, stronger). The recognition heuristic for such tasks is simply
stated: If one of two objects is recognized
and the other is not, then infer that the
16
recognized object has the higher value. 8

the brand) versus outside the store, among other factors. Brand recognition may be more important to the extent
that product decisions are made in the store.
Keller, supranote 142, at 3 (internal citations omitted).
163See

generally Vernon Gregg, Word Frequency, Recognition and Recall, in RECALL AND RECOGNITION 183 (John

Brown ed., 1976) (collecting research); Colin M. MacLeod & Kristina E. Kampe, Word Frequency Effects on
Recall, Recognition, and Word Fragment Completion Tests, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY
& COGNITION 132, 132 (1996) (same).
164MacLeod

& Kampe, supra note 163, at 132-33.

165MacLeod & Kampe, supra note 163, at 132-33.
166 Of

course, the list of high-frequency words will be considerably smaller than the list of generic marks (consider

"Shampoo," "DVD Player," "Spinach," etc.), and correlation between the two lists will vary significantly from
industry to industry. Accordingly, the most compelling justification for the use of inherent distinctiveness as a
factor in apportioning trademark protection and liability remains that discussed infra Part V.B.
167See Keller, supra note 142, at 9 ("[C]hoosing a familiar word representing a well-known concept or some other

common object or property as a brand name may facilitate brand recall, but . . . choosing a more unusual or
distinctive word may facilitate brand recognition.").
168GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART

41 (1999).
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The existence of this heuristic has been borne out by empirical data, but it is
limited in that it is believed to be triggered only in cases where (a) the decisionmaker recognizes the stimulus but does not have any additional information about
it, and (b) recognition is intuitively perceived to have some correlation to the target
attribute.' 69 It seems a good fit for the case of the hypothetical consumer from the
discussion above, in those instances where she has no distinguishing information
about the products she is considering other than their brand names. All else being
equal, if she recognizes a trademark affixed to one product but not the others, we
would expect her to select the product whose trademark she recognized, even if she
knew nothing else about it, because
she will intuitively conclude that it has a higher
70
value on her target criteria. 1
2. Acquired Distinctiveness,Fame, and the Role of Familiarity
As with the proxy factors under the various tests for liability, the proxy factors
for secondary meaning and fame have little to do with the nexus between a mark
and a maker. To the contrary, they all relate in some way to facts that would
influence the probability of a significant number of actual or potential consumers
having some exposure to the plaintiff s mark, either on the plaintiff's products or in
advertising and publicity (and the frequency of such exposure).1 7 1 While such
exposures may say nothing about consumer awareness of the relationship between a
mark and a manufacturer, they may contribute to the "affect pool" of the mark in
the mind of consumers, as well as provide more specific knowledge concerning the
products to which the mark is affixed that can be drawn on in future decisionmaking.1 72 Furthermore, such exposure might increase the probability that a mark
will be recognized in future encounters, triggering the recognition heuristic
described in the previous section. 173 Moreover, as demonstrated below, simple
repetition of such exposure may itself influence consumer responses to the mark.

169 See generally Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition

Heuristic, 109 PSYCHOL. REv. 75 (2002) (setting forth the empirical and theoretical bases for the recognition
heuristic).
170 See

Goldstein & Gigerenzer, supra note 169, at 78 (suggesting that where the prerequisites for the recognition

heuristic are met such judgments have "ecological rationality," meaning that the correlation of substitute attributes
to target attributes may be theoretically validated by environmental mediators that make reliance on the recognition
heuristic likely to lead to accurate outcomes). In the consumer context, this explanation seems sound insofar as
many of our less significant purchasing decisions-which we likely would not go to the trouble of extensively
educating ourselves-are informed not by direct experience but by word-of-mouth and advertising.
m Indeed, the "sales success" factor (see supra note 126 and accompanying text) is likely directly linked to affective
response, insofar as widespread and repeated purchases of a product imply satisfaction with the product and,
concurrently, a positive affective response to its trademark in a large number of consumers.
172 Such

specific knowledge may form "associative networks" around the mark in memory that are activated when

encountering the mark.

See Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary

Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1018-26 (2001).

However,

such networks likely play only a subordinate role in consumer decision-making. See infra notes 174-76 and
accompanying text.
173 See

supra Part IV.B. 1. Indeed, this effect of repeated exposure helps explain the inclusion of "[t]he extent of
actual recognition of the mark" as a factor in determining fame. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
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Secondary meaning and fame can be identified with features of memory and
their role in heuristic judgment. Again, the associative system of cognition plays an
important role. One consumer psychologist has proposed that secondary meaning
represents the creation of "associative networks" around a mark in the minds of a
substantial number of consumers, and that these networks are activated as part of
the recall process triggered by subsequent exposure to the trademark. 174 In other
words, through repeated exposure to a mark and experience with the types of goods
it is associated with, a consumer comes to recall with increasing ease relevant
information about, and experiences with, products bearing the mark whenever she
encounters the mark. Conceptually, this concept is similar to the notion of an affect
pool-a consumer's experiences with a trademark will tag that mark with layers of
meaning that will be automatically drawn on whenever the mark is subsequently
encountered and recalled. 175 Still, the separate cognitive processes triggered by
knowledge and affect underlie an important distinction between the "associative
network" and the "affective pool" in the trademark context: recent research
suggests that mental associations characterized by specific knowledge may indeed
result from repeated experience with a brand, but that such associations serve only
"subsidiary roles" in brand choice, with emotional or affective reactions and
76
attitudes playing the lead role. 1
The dominance of affective response in consumer choice suggests another
mechanism, beyond the affect pool, by which the breadth and frequency of
exposure to a trademark might play a role in consumer decision-making. Studies
show that simple familiarity with a stimulus increases positive affective response to
it. 177 In other words, the more often we are merely exposed to a stimulus, the
stronger our affective response to it will be and the more likely we will prefer it. 178

(TDRA), Pub. L. No. 109-312, sec. 2(1), § 43(c)(2)(A)(iii), 120 Stat. 1730, 1730-31 (2006) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
174See

Jacoby, supra note 172, at 1029 (arguing that when a significant portion of the relevant public develops

associative networks for a product or service, then that product or service can be said to have achieved secondary
meaning); see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2032
(2005) ("Trademark law, and the marketing literature with it, has long recognized that the more distinctive a
trademark is from other marks, the greater is consumers' 'awareness' of it and the more immediately 'accessible' it
is in their memory." (footnotes omitted)).
175See supranotes 143-47 and accompanying text.

176Punj & Hillyer, supra note 156, at 125-26; see Ambler et al., supra note 146, at 248 (citing references).
177Frederick, supra note 144, at 548, 553; see also Ambler et al., supra note 146, at 253-54 (discussing experimental
results showing significant correlation between brand familiarity and selection of the brand, and quicker decisionmaking when faced with a familiar brand than with unfamiliar brands).
178Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 144, at 400 ("[W]hen objects are presented to an individual
repeatedly, the 'mere exposure' is capable of creating a positive attitude or preference for these objects."); see also,
e.g., Robert F. Bomstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987, 106
PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 (1989) (reviewing studies that document the "mere exposure effect"). This feature of
affective response has implications for manipulative advertising similar to those identified by professors Hanson &
Kysar. See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143; see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
BehavioralismSeriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1420 (1999).
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As discussed above, 7 9 a hypothetical consumer may try to rationalize a purchase
by telling herself she is buying a product of high quality, high safety, high value, or
desirability, when in fact she is most likely relying on a simple affective response to
the trademark on the product's package. While this affective response may be
based on her experience with products bearing the mark, it may also be based on
nothing more than affectively loaded advertising of the mark; or, it may simply
arise from the fact that she has seen the mark more often than other marks. In
short, consumer familiarity with a trademark through any prior exposure-other
than one which generates negative affective responses-is likely to increase the
positive affective response to products bearing that mark, and influence consumer
decision-making accordingly. Thus, secondary meaning and fame, which are
generally measured in terms of the likelihood and magnitude of consumer exposure
to a trademark, are legal constructs that reflect the affect pool, the influence on
affect of repeated exposure and familiarity, and, to a lesser extent, the contribution
of repeated exposure to associative networks of meaning connected to the mark.
Quite simply, in the absence of negative associations with a mark, the more
widespread the mark, the stronger and more positive consumer response is likely to
be.
In sum, each of the metrics of mark strength used by courts to assess
trademark liability addresses facts that will tend to increase consumer preference
for products bearing the mark in question by influencing cognitive functions and
constructs, particularly those based on recognition and familiarity, that generate
positive affect response.
C. Similarity of Marks and Proximity of Markets: The Roles of
Similarity and Context
The discussion thus far is useful in the examination of how trademarks
operate, but it is relevant to trademark liability only to the extent that an accused
mark might be identical to a plaintiffs mark and used on an identical product,
thereby generating an identical response. To account for the law's extension of
liability beyond such circumstances (under either modem infringement doctrine or
dilution doctrine), the role of similarity and context must be addressed; indeed, the
two dimensions interact considerably. 180 Consumer response to a trademark that is
similar, but not identical, to another better-known mark-or identical to a betterknown mark used on a different type of product-will likely be influenced by three
types of cognitive phenomena: illusions, context effects, and anchoring biases.

79See supranotes 148-56 and accompanying text.
180 For

an earlier and somewhat different view of the interaction of similarity and context in the trademark arena, see
Jacoby, supra note 172, at 1034-40.
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1. Mark Similarity and Perceptual/CognitiveIllusions

The interaction of perception and memory often yields idiosyncratic results
that could have particular relevance to consumer decision-making. For example,
when faced with a word recognition task, we often fail to detect small errors, and
even fill in missing information, such that we are actually able to "see" a familiar
word even when letters are missing, transposed, or replaced with other letters or
abstract characters. 181 Memory can play similar tricks on us, particularly when a
novel, distorted, or misplaced stimulus is presented in a context where we would
expect to encounter a similar, familiar stimulus. For example, when asked, "How
many animals of each kind did Moses take with him on the ark," most people will
respond "two," knowing full well that Noah is the Bible's ark-builder.' 82 The
leading explanation for this phenomenon-known in the cognitive psychology
literature as the "Moses Illusion"-is that when our memory is probed with some
stimulus, such as a question, our cognitive system relies on "partial matching" to
relate the present experience to the contents of memory:
[Elverything we see is varied from different perspectives, so we need to perform partial
matches to recognize virtually anything. Consequently, people are accustomed to being
tolerant of discrepancies, and highly similar terms are allowed to slip by or are folded into
existing representations.

... Partial match is sufficient to retrieve information from
memory and is itself an
83
important matching process involved in memory retrieval. 1

The Moses Illusion reveals an important feature of recall tasks: when a stimulus
triggers a search of memory, we tend to overlook minor discrepancies between the
stimulus and the representation of an item in memory. Similar memory illusions
affect recognition tasks: we are more likely to falsely recognize a novel stimulus1 84if
it is semantically, morphologically, or phonologically related to familiar stimuli.

181

See generally Timothy R. Jordan, Sharon M. Thomas & Kenneth C. Scott-Brown,

The Illusory-Letters

Phenomenon: An Illustration of Graphemic Restoration in Visual Word Recognition, 28 PERCEPTION 1413 (1999)

(citing sources).
182

See generally Thomas D. Erickson & Mark E. Mattson, From Words to Meaning: A Semantic Illusion, 20 J.

VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 540 (1981).
183

Heekyeong Park & Lynne M. Reder, Moses Illusion, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND

BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY 275, 285 (Rtidiger F. Pohl ed., 2004).
184

See, e.g., Henry L. Roediger Ill & Kathleen B. McDermott, Creating False Memories: Remembering Words Not

Presented in Lists, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 803 (1995) (subjects

falsely recognized words that were semantically related to words in studied lists); Jeffery J. Franks & John D.
Bransford, Abstraction of Visual Patterns, 90 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 65 (1971) (subjects falsely recognized
unstudied transformations of prototype shapes with levels of recognition decreasing as degree of transformation
increased); Mitchell S. Sommers & Bryan P. Lewis, Who Really Lives Next Door: CreatingFalse Memories with
Phonological Neighbors, 40 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 83 (1999) (subjects falsely recognized unstudied
phonological neighbors of words in previously aurally-presented lists); see generally Henry L. Roediger, Kathleen
B. McDermott & Kerry J. Robinson, The Role of Associative Processes in Producing False Remembering, in 2
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Extrapolating these features of human perception and memory to the
trademark context, it is easy to see how similarity can play a role in consumer
decision-making. Subtle distortions of a known trademark may simply not be
noticed by a consumer. The distorted trademark may be erroneously recognized
even if completely novel. Indeed, it may even trigger the same affective response
and recollection of the same memories as those associated with the known, similar
trademark. In either case, the consumer would likely be completely unaware that
her response to the mark was based on a perceptual or cognitive error.
2. Market Proximity and Context Effects
The modalities of the illusions described above also suggest a role for market
proximity in consumer decision-making. It has been shown, for example, that the
Moses Illusion dissipates if the distorted term in the stimulus doesn't semantically
match the rest of the stimulus-people balk when asked how many animals Nixon
brought on the ark. 185 Put more generally:
Semantic cohesion of the critical [distorted] term with the embedding context or
proposition . . . affects the occurrence of the illusion. When the distorted terms are totally
unrelated to the script that is queried, the discrepancy is readily noticed. On the other
hand, when the replaced term is related to the remainder of the proposition or the general
context of the query, noticing the distortions is quite difficult. In other words, the more
consistent the critical terms in the question are with the script or knowledge structure
associated
with [the memory to be recalled], the harder it is to notice that the wrong term
86
is used. 1

Just as the context of the sentence used as a memory probe in the Moses
Illusion experiments limits the types of distortions that can go unnoticed, market
context may influence the effect of a trademark on the consuming public. For
example, a twelve-ounce aluminum can emblazoned with the words "Cold-Cola" in
white-on-red script would probably automatically trigger associations with CocaCola beverages in the average consumer, whereas the same logo on a spray bottle
of bathroom cleaner would cause consumers to shake their heads in befuddlement.
The same sort of disconnect is possible along other dimensions of market
proximity. We expect to see advertisements for "Goodyear" in automotive
magazines, but not food and wine magazines. We expect to find "Microsoft"
products in technology stores and on the internet, but not at clothing stores. We
expect "Rolex" watches to cost thousands of dollars, not ten dollars.
Marketing research bears out the importance of consistency of mark and
context. Examining the marketing strategy of "brand extension"-the introduction
of a new type of product under an existing, established brand name-researchers
have concluded that consumers respond most favorably to extensions into product
THEORIES OF MEMORY 187 (Martin A. Conway, Susan E. Gathercole & Cesare Comoldi eds., 1998) (collecting

recent research on memory illusions).
185Park & Reder, supra note 183, at 281-82.
186

Park & Reder, supra note 183, at 283.
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categories that "fit" well conceptually with the parent brand's product category,
without being essentially identical to that category.1 87 Indeed, sharply incongruent
brand extensions not only sour consumers on the extension itself, but they can also
generate moderate feedback effects that diminish consumer response to the brand
name generally, and to a lesser extent even to the original product bearing the
brand. 8 8 Consumer psychologists attribute these context-sensitive responses to the
cognitive burdens of reconciling the associations a mark activates in memory with
the novel experience of its extension. When encountered in a new context, the
mark triggers a cognitive effort to "resolve and find meaning in the incongruity,"
and the success of this effort generates a positive emotional response.' 89 Where the
context is so far removed from that with which the mark is associated that no
resolution of the incongruity is possible, the unsuccessful cognitive effort to find
some resolution "typically stimulate[s] negative feelings of frustration and
helplessness." 190 Once again, affect plays a central role, here as the expression of
cognitive response to the interaction of a mark and its context. An accused mark
appearing in a commercial context similar, but not identical, to that of a similar
plaintiffs mark may get an affective boost from the consumer's effort to integrate
the new context into her associations with the mark-with the plaintiffs mark
likely receiving a similar boost. Conversely, an accused mark appearing in a
commercial context irreconcilably dissimilar from that of a similar plaintiffs mark

'87See,

e.g., David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 54 J. MARKETING 27

(1990) (identifying the role of "fit" in the success of brand extensions); Paul A. Bottomley & Stephen J.S. Holden,
Do We Really Know How ConsumersEvaluate Brand Extensions? EmpiricalGeneralizationsBased on Secondary
Analysis of Eight Studies, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 494 (2001) (confirming the hypothesis of Aaker and Keller
against subsequent critiques).
Sandra J. Milberg, C. Whan Park & Michael S. McCarthy, Managing Negative Feedback Effects Associated with
Brand Extensions: The Impact ofAlternative Branding Strategies, 6 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 119, 132-33 (1997)
(demonstrating negative "feedback" effects on parent brands of ill-fitting product extensions); Barbara Loken &
Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand Extensions Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J.
MARKETING 71 (1993) (same); Deborah Roedder John, Barbara Loken & Christopher Joiner, The Negative Impact
of Extensions: Can Flagship Products Be Diluted?, 62 J. MARKETING 19 (1998) (finding that "flagship products"
are less vulnerable to negative feedback extensions than the brand itself). Some consumer psychologists have
already attempted to make the leap connecting the dilution concept of the brand extension literature with the
dilution injury set forth in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. See generally Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby,
Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 265 (2000).
However, as discussed infra Part V.A, the two concepts cannot be neatly mapped onto one another as the law
currently stands.

's

189 Joan Meyers-Levy, Therese A. Louie & Mary T. Curren, How Does the Congruity of Brand Names Affect

Evaluationsof Brand Name Extensions?, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 46, 47 (1994).
190Meyers-Levy, Louie & Curren, supra note 189, at 47. The inability to resolve the conflict can be seen as a kind of
cognitive dissonance, a mental contradiction that generates negative affective response. See generally Eddie
Harmon-Jones, Cognitive Dissonance and Experienced Negative Affect: Evidence that Dissonance Increases
Experienced Negative Affect Even in the Absence ofAversive Consequences, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1490 (2000) (demonstrating that a common laboratory model for generating cognitive dissonance causes test
subjects to experience negative affect). Similarly, the positive response to the ability to resolve an incongruity is
consistent with that portion of cognitive dissonance theory that posits attitude change as a strategy to reduce the
psychological discomfort that arises from dissonance. See generally Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine, On the
Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort, 67 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 382 (1994) (demonstrating a model of cognitive dissonance wherein the dissonance motivates the
individual to reduce psychological discomfort by changing the attitude that generates the dissonance).
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will not only likely trigger a negative affective response, but it will also likely cause
a feedback of negative affective associations with the plaintiffs mark as used on
the plaintiff's products.
3. Anchoring Bias
Similarity of marks and proximity of markets can also affect consumer
decision-making by triggering the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. Human
beings often estimate values in conditions of uncertainty by starting with an initial
given value (an "anchor") and then adjusting from that value to arrive at a final
answer. 191 The anchor may be derived from a cue presented to the decision-maker
or self-generated in the process of searching memory for a candidate response.
When we use anchors in our decision-making, we tend to make insufficient
adjustments that lead to biases in favor of the initial anchor. 192 These biases
manifest themselves even when we are consciously aware (a) that the anchor is
irrelevant, and (b) that it may nevertheless inappropriately influence our
judgment.' 93
In the typical laboratory test for anchoring effects, an arbitrary value is given
to test subjects as a cue prior to a comparative judgment task. In such situations,
the initial cue acts as a "prime," activating the cue and information associated with
it in memory. 194 When performing a subsequent comparative judgment task, the
accessibility of the activated information leads the decision-maker to evaluate the
suitability of the cue as an answer. 195 "Because people evaluate hypotheses by
trying to confirm them, the comparative assessment generates information
disproportionately consistent with the anchor value, thereby biasing the subsequent
judgment."' 196 In some response tasks when a priming cue is not given, people

'91 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT

UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 3, 14-18.
192Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 3, 14-18. For example, in one famous study subjects were asked to estimate the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations membership after watching a wheel containing numbers
from one to one hundred being spun. The wheel was rigged to land either on ten or sixty-five. When the wheel
landed on the lower number, subjects' mean estimate was that African countries comprised only twenty-five
percent of the United Nations; when the wheel landed on the higher number, the mean estimate was forty-five
percent. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 14.; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143, at 667.
113See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 143, at 668 ("What is striking about this demonstration is that the anchor
provided to the subjects was overtly random and irrelevant, yet still it had a significant impact on the subjects'
intuitive judgments." (emphasis omitted)); Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporatingthe Irrelevant:
Anchors in Judgments of Belief and Value, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 9, at 120, 125
(summarizing evidence that neither warning subjects not to be influenced by the anchor nor awareness by subjects
of the anchor's irrelevance could eliminate biases in favor of the anchor).
9 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of Selective
Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 444 (1997).

'9' See Chapman & Johnson, supranote 193, at 130-33.
196Epley & Gilovich, supra note 153, at 312 (internal citation omitted); see also Chapman & Johnson, supra note
193, at 133 ("[A]nchors have their effect because decision makers consider reasons why their value for the target
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attempting to assess a value will "self-generate" an anchor at a starting point they
believe is close to the target value and then adjust from that anchor to arrive at a
response without performing any more cognitively taxing calculations. 197 Because
the adjustment effort is itself taxing, it tends to cease as soon as a minimally
plausible value is reached, leading to a bias in favor of the self-generated anchor. 198
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic provides a mechanism for similarity
of marks and proximity of markets to affect consumer decision-making even where
the consumer is not suffering from any illusion, and even where context effects are
playing only a minor role. A consumer confronted with a product bearing an
unfamiliar trademark that is similar to a known trademark in the same product
category may "self-generate" the known trademark as an anchor in an effort to
assess the suitability of the product bearing the novel mark, rather than embarking
on a far more taxing effort to educate herself about the meaning and significance of
the novel mark. As a result, her response to the novel mark is likely to be biased in
the direction of her response to the known mark. Conversely, where a second
comer's mark is used in a commercial context different from, but still related to,
that of the mark's owner, the owner's mark and product may serve as an anchor,
activating associations with the mark and product in the consumer's memory,
which then biases her response to the second comer's product in the direction of
those associations. 199 In either case, the consumer's response to the novel mark
will likely be closer to her response to the known mark than it would be if the two
marks were completely dissimilar.
D. Consumer Care:Minimizing Illusions, MitigatingBias
The last proxy factor analyzed by courts in trademark cases, consumer care,
can be understood as reflecting the role that attention plays in the cognitive
processes described in this section. For example, the types of perceptual illusions
described above often dissipate with sufficient time and attention by the reader,2 °°
as anyone who has ever done a quick read of a text followed by a close proofread
can likely attest. In contrast, memory illusions such as the Moses Illusion seem
considerably less susceptible to dissipation by increased attention. 20 1 The
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic also appears to be influenced by increased

item is like the anchor, but show relative neglect for reasons why their value for the item is unlike the anchor."). In

essence, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic for externally provided anchors appears to be a species of
confirmation bias.

See Chapman & Johnson, supra note 193, at 133-34 (discussing the connection between

anchoring phenomena and confirmation bias).
197 Epley & Gilovich, supra note 153, at 312.

118Epley & Gilovich, supra note 153, at 314-15.
'9'The qualification of this hypothesis, that the commercial context of the marks be related, takes into account the

previous discussion concerning the cognitive dissonance and negative affect that arises from encountering a known
stimulus in a completely foreign context. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
200See Jordan, Thomas & Scott-Brown, supra note 181, at 1413.

201Park & Reder, supra note 183, at 286-87.
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attention, though only in the case of self-generated anchors. 20 2 A decision-maker
with the time, ability, and inclination to devote increased attention and effortful
thinking to her decision is able to mitigate the bias that results from the tendency to
stop adjusting as soon as a plausible value is reached, largely because she continues
to adjust after a decision-maker who did not perform such additional thinking
would have stopped. 20 3 Where an anchor is provided to the decision-maker as a
cue rather than being self-generated, however, additional thinking and attention
does not appear to significantly affect the resulting bias, mainly because the bias in
such cases is akin to a confirmation bias rather than the result of actual
adjustment.20 4
In the trademark context, these effects of increased attention and care suggest
that some of the effects of mark similarity and market proximity can be dissipated.
It appears that increased care can considerably mitigate the illusions and biases that
arise from a subtly distorted mark, either by dissipating the illusion that causes the
consumer to "see" a known mark in its stead, or by allowing her to continue to
adjust her response away from the representation of the known mark she retrieved
from memory. In contrast, context effects appear far more difficult to dissipate; a
novel mark presented in the same commercial context as a similar known mark is
extremely likely to bias consumer response. Similarly, where a novel mark is
identical to a known mark, such that it activates memories of the mark itself rather
than triggering a search of memory for similar marks, the priming effect of the
mark is unlikely to be dissipated by additional attention or care.
E. Interaction of the Proxy Factors
Taken together, the aspects of cognition discussed in this section will
influence consumer decision-making in non-rational but somewhat predictable
ways. For example, where a plaintiffs mark is strong enough to trigger a positive
affective response, an accused mark similar enough to create a perceptual illusion
may trigger the same affective response in time-limited or attention-limited
purchasing situations.
Similarly, an identical accused mark in a different
commercial context may trigger a positive affective response if the context is close
enough to that of the plaintiffs mark to be cognitively resolvable, such that the
representation of the plaintiffs mark in memory serves as a plausible basis to form
a judgment about the accused product. Notably, in this case it is unlikely that
additional time or attention will dissipate the likely bias toward the affective
content of the plaintiffs mark, given that the mark itself is presented as an anchor
rather than being self-generated.2 5 However, as the degree of mark similarity and

202See generally Epley

& Gilovich, supra note 153.

203Epley

& Gilovich, supra note 153, at 317.

204Epley

& Gilovich, supra note 153, at 312, 315-16; see supranote 196 and accompanying text.

205The

resistance of the bias generated by identical marks to amelioration through increased care counsels for unique

treatment of identical marks in liability regimes. Indeed, federal infringement law imposes stricter penalties for
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market proximity between the two marks decreases, it becomes far less likely that
affective response to the plaintiffs mark will form a basis for the response to the
accused mark. Only where the representation of the plaintiffs mark in memory is
exceedingly strong-and thus very easy to call to mind-would we expect a
consumer to self-generate the plaintiffs mark (and the affective content associated
with it) when searching her memory for a basis to analyze an accused mark that is
only marginally similar. Finally, where the commercial context of a novel accused
mark is so far removed from that of a plaintiffs mark that there appears to be no
way to cognitively resolve the difference between them, we would expect the
consumer to have a negative affective response to the accused mark, with a
moderate negative feedback effect on the plaintiff's mark.
V. A Behavioralist Theory of Trademark Liability
The previous part identified a number of cognitive processes that will
influence consumer responses to trademarks and explained how they are connected
to the proxy factors applied by courts in setting the boundaries of trademark
liability. Despite their potential to generate error and bias, the boundedly rational
cognitive processes outlined in the previous part are useful insofar as thoroughly
rational approaches to purchase decisions would be grossly time-consuming and
inefficient. 206 As discussed above, associative processes such as "choosing by
liking" are quick and easy decision-making strategies that spare us the need for
more cognitively taxing efforts.20 7 But this conservation of effort becomes selfdefeating if the speedy judgments of boundedly rational consumers generate
choices that are inconsistent with empirical facts or consumer expectations.
Because consumer memories of and responses to a known trademark can influence
their response to a novel mark even in the absence of any rational basis for such
influence (indeed, even where the consumer knows there is no rational basis for
such influence), certain novel marks are likely to lead consumers to make
purchasing decisions that they would not make if they were proceeding rationally
based on more robust information. Each of the proxy factors discussed above
addresses a cognitive bias or susceptibility to error that makes such influence more
or less probable. By using the proxy factors as measures for the boundaries of
trademark liability, courts are essentially minimizing the effects of these biases and
errors by proscribing and deterring the use of trademarks that cause such influence.

counterfeiting than for other types of infringement. See 15 U.S.C. § II 17(b)-(c) (2006) (establishing statutory and
treble damages for counterfeiting).
206That trademarks serve to lower consumer search costs is a fundamental tenet of the dominant law-and-economics
model of trademark law. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987); see also Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the
ConstitutionalEdge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 189-93 (2004); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 2:5, at 2-7 to -10.

However, the standard economic analysis is something of an inversion of the argument of this article: where lawand-economics scholars presume that the legal regime creates the efficiencies that justify its rules, this article
proposes that the cognitive processes of consumers are themselves the engines of efficiency, and the legal regime is
constructed to harness those efficiencies while mitigating the errors that inevitably accompany them.
207See supra notes 140-42, 148-56 and accompanying text.
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In short, the trademark liability regime is best understood as a debiasing strategy. 208
As long as the marketplace reflects the expectations of boundedly rational
consumers-for example, by requiring that products bearing identical trademarks
have similar properties-the tendency of bounded rationality to introduce error and
bias into consumer decision-making will be neutralized.2 °9
Shaping the market to ensure that similarly marked products bear similar
properties could be a complex undertaking involving costly regulation and
inspection regimes. To avoid such complexity, the bulk of federal trademark law
delegates this responsibility to manufacturers. The primary mechanism by which
this delegation is accomplished is the fundamental principle of trademark law: a
one-manufacturer-per-mark rule, accompanied by a private right of action. This
mechanism is the pillar of the statutory trademark regime. 210
As law and
economics scholars have argued, this simple mechanism gives manufacturers
powerful incentives to produce high-quality products. 211
But the onemanufacturer-per-mark rule also has the important benefit of making it empirically
more likely that similarly marked products will have similar properties, in at least
two ways. First, to the extent that a common manufacturing process is likely to
generate relatively consistent products as output, the one-manufacturer-per-mark
rule will tend to increase the similarity of similarly marked products. Second,
insofar as the incentives described by law and economics scholars are effective,
manufacturers in a one-manufacturer-per-mark environment will tend to take steps
to ensure the consistency of products bearing their mark, to the extent they are able
to do so. Finally, the private right of action accompanying the one-manufacturerper-mark rule assigns enforcement of the regime to the party in the system with the
greatest incentive to monitor the market for behaviors that might generate consumer
bias or error: the manufacturer who benefits from boundedly rational consumer
decision-making in a market where his mark is exclusively associated with his
products.21 2

208

Cf Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 207-08 (2006)

(describing product bans as an insulating strategy to eliminate the effects of optimism bias with respect to risky
products). What this article refers to as a "debiasing strategy" would likely be referred to (or perhaps denigrated)
by Jolls and Sunstein as an "insulating" strategy. See id. at 225 n.21 (distinguishing between the authors'
definition of "debiasing" and "insulating" strategies, the latter of which accepts boundedly rational behavior as
given and seeks to reduce or eliminate its effects on legal outcomes).
Cf Frederick, supra note 144, at 554 ("The success of using one's immediate affective response as a choice
heuristic depends on how closely it corresponds to the actual value or subsequent utility.").

209

210See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1091 (2006) (establishing trademark registers on the basis of a one-manufacturer-per-mark

rule); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-15, 1125 (providing remedies and private rights of action in trademark cases to, inter
alia, the trademark registrant or senior user).
211See supra note 206.
212See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 417 (1999) ("Ownership was assigned to

the person who adopted the mark for her trade, not because she had created it or its favorable associations, but
because such person was conveniently placed and strongly motivated to vindicate the broader public interest in a
mark's ability to identify accurately the source of the goods to which it was attached."). This mechanism is the
essential bargain of the trademark regime: "the trademark producer's willingness to assume the [consumer's] costs
of search in order to gain the benefits of persuasion." Beebe, supra note 174, at 2066. As Professor Beebe's
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While this mechanism is a simple and elegant solution to what could be a
thorny debiasing problem, standing alone it is not sufficient to prevent consumers
from making decisions out of bias or error, due to the effects of the cognitive
phenomena discussed in Part IV. Based on that discussion, we can expect
consumer decision-making to be improperly influenced in two general ways, which
I characterize as "ex ante" and "point-of-sale" manipulation. 213 Ex ante
manipulation refers to the ability of experience to alter the "affective pool" and
other information associated with a mark in memory; 21 4 these experiences will
occur in advance of the purchasing decision that is the ultimate target of trademark
liability.
Point-of-sale manipulation refers to features of the purchasing
environment that influence the consumer's judgment at the time a purchasing
decision is made, including everything from traditional "passing off" to the
illusions, context effects, and anchoring effects discussed above.21 5 A properly
designed liability regime will have to address both ex ante and point-of-sale
manipulations; the most obvious way to accomplish this is by proscribing
trademark uses that generate them.
An additional layer of rules to encompass subtle trademark manipulations has
historically been provided by the courts through the gradual expansion of liability
described in Part II and the development of the proxy factors discussed in Part III.
The fact that these doctrines developed by fits and starts, within the framework of
the statutory regime and in the shadow of the historical aversion to property rights
in trademarks, is likely responsible for the law's preoccupation with the
relationship between mark and maker, as well as the battle in dilution theory
between uniqueness (an ex ante concern) and free-riding (a point-of-sale concern).
The result is a confused doctrinal structure that aims somewhat to the side of the
manipulations that it could be targeting directly. The remainder of this article
explores the ways in which the species of liability described in Part III
approximate, or fail to approximate, the point-of-sale and ex ante manipulations
that trademark law appears to be trying to prevent. A way out of the dilution
dilemma becomes evident upon application of the discussion of Part IV to the
disparities between current doctrine and the doctrines implied by behavioralist
analysis. Further, because strict adherence to a behavioralist model of trademark
liability has the potential to greatly broaden the scope of such liability, this article
closes with an analysis of policy objections that may be raised by the model.

analysis suggests, the one-mark-per-manufacturer baseline and the privileged position of the first comer give
trademark law an inherently circular and expansionist structure. See Beebe, supra note 174, at 2066-69.
213

As should be evident from the discussion in the text, ex ante and point-of-sale manipulation correlate to the

cognitive processes of memory encoding and memory retrieval, respectively. See generally Scott C. Brown &
Fergus I.M. Craik, Encoding and Retrieval ofInformation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEMORY 93 (Endel
Tulving & Fergus I.M. Craik eds., 2000) (outlining developments in understanding human memory processes).
214 See

supra notes 146-47, 171-78 and accompanying text.

215 See supra Parts
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A. Understanding the Species of Liability
Set against a background rule of one manufacturer per mark, analysis of the
cognitive phenomena described in Part IV provides a sufficient basis for setting the
boundaries of trademark liability in such a way as to prevent most, if not all, of the
manipulations of consumer decision-making a second comer's use of a trademark
can cause. The discussion in Part IV makes clear how such manipulations operate;
the fact that they correlate to the proxy factors developed by the courts suggests
that the federal trademark regime captures, or has the capacity to capture, most of
the harms at issue in trademark cases. But by casting their decisions as assessments
of consumer beliefs as to the relationship between mark and maker, courts add a
needless layer of complexity (or perhaps deception) to the analysis, 2 16 obscuring
the justifications for liability, increasing opportunities for error, and generating
distracting and counterproductive policy debates such as those currently wracking
dilution law. By casting off the historical tethers that link liability to such
consumer beliefs and tying it instead to consumer reactions to a mark itself,
Congress and the courts could shift focus from circular policy debates about the
purpose of the trademark regime to more productive efforts to assess and calibrate
the regime's effects on the marketplace.
The various species of liability outlined in Part III of this article are poor
substitutes for a direct assessment of consumers' actual behavioral responses to
trademarks. They serve mainly to provide a rationally describable justification for
the imposition of liability that is in fact based on boundedly rational behavior. A
brief comparison of two subspecies of infringement will demonstrate how this
effort to say one thing while doing another leads to unnecessary and misleading
complexity.
The most basic and longest-recognized form of liability-for
infringement based on point-of-sale confusion 2 77 -can be easily described in terms
of the cognitive processes outlined in Part IV. An accused mark that by virtue of
cognitive illusions, context effects, and anchoring bias is likely at the point of sale
to lead to a purchase decision influenced by consumers' affective reactions to
someone else's mark is precisely the type of use courts are likely to find infringing
when they apply the proxy factors. This is the quintessential form of point-of-sale
manipulation: a consumer's response to a known mark is invoked and manipulated
through non-rational cognitive processes, leading to a purchase decision that the
consumer would not otherwise have made.
The purportedly distinct doctrine of initial-interest confusion is nothing more
than a special case of this general phenomenon, one dominated by anchoring
effects. Where a novel mark generates either a fleeting perceptual illusion that is
dissipated by consumer attention or triggers the recall of a similar known mark,
anchoring effects can continue to bias the affective response to the mark in the
216 The

legal fiction of the anonymous source is perhaps the clearest manifestation of the wasteful complexity of

trademark law's obsession with legal history and the deleterious effects of that obsession on legal processes and
outcomes. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
217See

supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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direction of the illusory or recalled image, which explains why courts will impose
liability against the users of such marks where the anchor is already used as
another's trademark. That a consumer is not confused as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of the product's manufacturer or the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of the product at the time of sale is considered no barrier to liability in
initial-interest cases.21 s This fact strongly supports the hypothesis of this article,
that what courts are really measuring in infringement cases is not confusion at all.
Absent confusion at the time of sale, it is only the bias generated by anchoring
effects that justifies this class of trademark liability. Notably, this bias poses
precisely the same risk as point-of-sale confusion-that the consumer will make a
purchase decision she would not otherwise make as a result of her boundedly
rational reaction to a trademark. By attempting to explain such bias in terms of
confusion as defined under the Lanham Act, rather than as a function of bounded
rationality, the courts substitute a rationally tractable but descriptively misleading
theory of harm for a more descriptively powerful theory that is unfamiliar to the
historical tradition of trademark law. The result is an unpersuasive, needlessly
complex, misleading, and formalistic doctrinal architecture that obscures the
justifications for imposing liability and multiplies the potential for error.
One might be tempted, based on the two prior examples, to believe that the
descriptive shortcomings of the current doctrine could be ameliorated by assuming
that infringement represents point-of-sale manipulation, and that dilution-with its
overt concern for the prospective source-identifying capacity of a plaintiff's
mark-must therefore represent ex ante manipulation. This would, unfortunately,
be an oversimplification. One barrier to this neat division of doctrines is the fact
that in every point-of-sale manipulation lies the seed of an ex ante manipulation.
When a consumer makes a purchase decision based on bias or error, her experience
with the purchased product will itself influence her future judgment. 2 19 To the
extent her experience is inconsistent with the properties of the mark owner's actual
products, the consumer's future decisions will be improperly biased by the results
of her earlier purchase decision. Generalizing this dynamic to the market at large,
there is an obvious potential for ex ante and point-of-sale manipulations to feed on
each other, snowballing to the point where trademarks become completely
unreliable as a basis for consumer decision-making.
The doctrine of post-sale confusion illustrates the current doctrine's inability
to address this dual and self-reinforcing property of trademark manipulation. This
class of liability, based on the influence on future purchasers of other consumers'
possession of products bearing an accused mark,22 ° would appear to be a form of ex
ante manipulation. It is not the immediate effect of the encounter with an accused
mark, but the effect of this encounter on a consumer's future decision-making that
liability for post-sale confusion ostensibly seeks to curtail. However, one could just
218See

supra note 84 and sources cited therein.

219See

supra notes 146-47, 174-76 and accompanying text.

220See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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as easily argue that post-sale confusion constitutes a point-of-sale manipulation,
albeit one that cannot be plausibly explained in terms of consumer beliefs about the
connection between mark and maker. The cases describing post-sale confusion
generally deal with "knock-offs" of luxury or status goods, suggesting that it is the
affective response to the status conveyed by the mark that leads consumers to
decide to purchase the accused goods. 221 This being the case, the decision to
purchase a knock-off can be understood as an anchoring phenomenon, functionally
indistinguishable from initial-interest confusion. Indeed, the only real difference
between the two scenarios is the lack of any plausible basis to claim that there was
even an instant where the consumer in the post-sale confusion scenario was
"confused" as outlined under the Lanham Act. In short, courts parsing these three
species of infringement have wasted considerable effort attempting to invent
strained and divergent justifications for liability against what are in fact minor
variations of precisely the same phenomenon. 222 Again, the law's preoccupation
with the mark/maker nexus obscures the harms at issue in trademark cases and the
justifications for imposing liability.
The interrelationship of point-of-sale and ex ante manipulations, and the
concomitant impossibility of neatly assigning the former to infringement doctrine
and the latter to dilution doctrine, is also largely responsible for the crippling
theoretical debates that have brought federal dilution law to its current state of
indeterminacy. Originally conceived as a way to extend trademark rights outside
the immediate commercial sphere of the owner's use,22 3 dilution can be seen as an
obsolete gap-filling measure, capturing point-of-sale manipulations that went
unremedied under the infringement doctrine of Schechter's day but are now
221See

supra note 85 and sources cited therein. As Professor Beebe notes:

[F]irms produce trademarks as status goods, . . . consumers consume trademarks to signal status, and . . . courts
routinely invest trademarks with legal protection in an effort to preserve this status-signaling function. The culture
industries-and what industries aren't?-have long sold trademarks as commodities in their own right. Entire areas
of trademark doctrine cannot be understood except as systems of rules designed to facilitate the commodificationindeed, the "industrial production"-of social distinction.
Beebe, supra note 79, at 624 (footnote omitted).
222

This discussion omits the fourth and final infringement theory-reverse confusion-not because the theory is

incompatible with the behavioralist model, but because reverse confusion is a special case where administrability
concerns trump the policy of exploiting bounded rationality to streamline consumer decision-making. At first
blush, the concept of reverse confusion would seem to challenge this article's contention that trademark liability
exists to harness the affect-driven bounded rationality of consumers; after all, the doctrine proscribes use of a
trademark that generates a strong affective response in favor of one that does not, or at least does so to a lesser
degree. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. But rather than engage in a complex and costly fight over
which manufacturer's use of a mark generates the strongest affective response, trademark law imposes a bright-line
rule of priority-in-time, which combined with the notice system of the Federal Register, attempts to avoid such
disputes entirely. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1091 (2006) (establishing the Principal and Supplemental
Trademark Registers and the procedures for their operation); cf Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 379, 387-88 (1985) (outlining generic arguments for and against bright-line notice rules in legal systems
such as property law). Like all bright-line rules, the priority-in-time rule in trademark law will invariably lead to
undesirable results at the margins-such as the proscription of a mark that eases consumer decision-making-but
this may be deemed an acceptable exchange for the increased administrability of the system as a whole.
223See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
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subsumed within the broadened infringement provisions of the modem Lanham
Act.224 Yet owing to the antipathy of contemporary doctrine to such broad
trademark rights, the original enunciation of dilution theory under the rubric of
uniqueness was directed at ex ante concerns, despite its author's apparent concern
for point-of-sale manipulations associated with free-riding. 225 It is precisely the
dual nature of trademark harms-the tendency of ex ante manipulations to ripen
into point-of-sale manipulations, and vice-versa, in a self-amplifying loop-that
allowed Schechter to carry out this theoretical pas de deux-one which is being
repeated today in the clashes between Congress and the courts.226
The
behavioralist model has the potential to liberate trademark doctrine from this
dilemma, by accounting for the interconnectedness of all forms of trademark
liability.
Taking as an example the standard dilution-by-blurring scenario of a famous
mark being used by a second comer in a commercial context far removed from that
of its owner, the discussion of Part IV suggests that the second comer's product will
receive an affective boost where the commercial contexts are related enough to be
cognitively resolvable, but will generate negative affect where the commercial
contexts are too far removed for such resolution.227 This effect suggests an
explanation for the earlier observation that the policies of infringement and freeriding theories of dilution are identical.228 In cases where the commercial context
of an accused mark is close enough to that of the plaintiff's mark to generate a
positive affective response, infringement and free-riding dilution will be
functionally indistinguishable. Both species of liability proscribe trademark uses in
which a novel mark triggers a more positive affective response than it otherwise
would due to its similarity to a known mark; the cognitive phenomena that generate
such a bias provide a single basis for liability under infringement doctrine and
under free-riding theories of dilution. It may be that Congress believes modem
infringement doctrine is under-inclusive with respect to this type of point-of-sale
manipulation, just as the under-inclusiveness of the "same descriptive properties"
standard led Schechter to propose the dilution remedy in the first place. But the
legislative decision to remedy this shortcoming by promulgating an almost entirely
redundant remedy that by its terms only obliquely addresses the targeted
conduct,2 29 rather than expanding the scope of the existing remedy, has generated

224See supra notes

39-49 and accompanying text; see generally Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable:Dilution

and Infringement in TrademarkLaw, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949 (2001) (arguing that dilution is a transitional remedy
designed to overcome the obsolescence of infringement doctrine in times of changing economic and technological
conditions).
225See supra notes

37-38 and accompanying text.

226See supra notes

2-6, 54-78 and accompanying text.

227See supra notes

187-90 and accompanying text.

228See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.

229See supra notes 54-59, 67-77, 134-39 and accompanying text.
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unnecessary confusion and further complicated the justifications for trademark
liability.
Just as the free-riding theory of dilution parallels the point-of-sale
manipulations of infringement, the uniqueness theory of dilution could be
understood as a foil for infringement's ex ante aspects-the pollution of the affect
pool and associative networks surrounding the plaintiffs mark with associations
that bear no empirical relationship to the plaintiff s products.2 3 ° Were this the case,
we could consider the two doctrines entirely redundant. But there is another ex
ante effect that uniqueness-based dilution can create-through both blurring and
tarnishment. This effect arises from the negative affective feedback that accrues to
a familiar mark when consumers encounter the mark in a cognitively irresolvable
context.231 Due to the limitation of infringement liability to commercial contexts
similar to those of the mark owner's actual use (which will almost certainly
correlate to contexts that lend themselves to cognitive resolution), such reactions
will likely fall outside of the manipulations identified with infringement.
Nevertheless, such uses have the potential to cause consumers to make decisions
they would not otherwise make with respect to the senior user's products in future
purchasing scenarios by altering affective associations with the senior user's mark.
However, we have seen that the negative feedback effect on the known mark is
likely to be less significant than the negative affective response that will accrue to
the novel mark as a result of the contextual incompatibility. 232 In other words,
where a diluting use cannot also be described as infringing by virtue of its point-ofsale effects, it is likely to be an unsuccessful marketing strategy. Given that such
uses are the antithesis of free-riding, and actually harm the second comer's
prospects in the marketplace, one would expect them to be extremely rare, more
likely based on coincidence or ignorance of the senior user's mark than any project
to manipulate consumer reactions to it. 233 Yet such manipulation appears to be the
230See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. For most well-known marks, the typical tarnishing contexts of

sexual activity and drug use will generally be cognitively unresolvable, suggesting that tamishment is merely a
special case of the more general ex ante manipulation of uniqueness-theory blurring. See supra note 139 and
accompanying text (describing the typical association of tarnishment with drugs and sexual activity).
232See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
233 The rarity of such manipulations is further suggested by the unlikelihood that a consumer would independently

recall (without cueing) a known mark in a commercial context far enough removed from its typical context that the
distance would generate unresolvable cognitive dissonance resulting in negative affective response. Given the low
baseline probability of such recall, and taking into account earlier discussions about the unique anchoring effects
attributable to identical marks, we would expect the type of ex ante manipulation discussed in this paragraph to
manifest itself only where the known mark is extremely strong and perceptually indistinguishable from the novel
mark, which is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Moseley. Compare supra notes 199-205 and
accompanying text (discussing the unique cognitive effects of identical marks) with Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (noting the strong probative value of identical marks in dilution cases).
However, to the extent that many dilution cases involve explicitly referential use of well-known marks in situations
that arguably do not involve commercial trademark use, see, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215
U.S.P.Q. 124, 134 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1191-93 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), tarnishment could also be seen as analogous to defamation claims, though this aspect of the remedy may not
survive the TDRA. See Beebe, supra note 73, at 1172-74 (arguing that the TDRA includes a source-designation
requirement that would preclude its use to enjoin, for example, appropriationist art).
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only justification for a distinct legal remedy based on the uniqueness theory of
dilution that is not already encompassed by other theories.
In sum, the species of liability that exist under current trademark law are
largely redundant. Because of the law's focus on consumer beliefs about the
connection between mark and maker, rather than their automatic cognitive reactions
to trademarks, courts have proposed multiple unpersuasive models in an effort to
capture relatively minor variations in certain cognitive processes. These processes
are susceptible to two broad classes of manipulation: point-of-sale manipulations,
which influence the consumer's judgment at the time a purchasing decision is
made, and ex ante manipulations, which influence consumer memories and
associations in advance of a purchasing decision. Neither category can be clearly
mapped to any current theory of trademark liability, though the tools for detecting
and analyzing them exist in the proxy factors developed by the courts for analyzing
all species of trademark liability. The discussion in this section suggests that
current conceptions of infringement may be under-inclusive to the extent that a
dilution remedy is seen as necessary to correct free-riding problems, while the
prevailing uniqueness-based conception of dilution provides a unique remedy only
for a very small and relatively inconsequential class of trademark manipulations.
From this analysis, several policy prescriptions emerge. First, it is apparent
that the maintenance of two separate trademark remedies is unwarranted. Insofar as
free-riding dilution is essentially indistinguishable from infringement, and the
manipulations addressed solely by uniqueness-based dilution are of such minor
concern and remote probability that they do not merit legal intervention, it would
appear that there is no real need for a dilution remedy. Second, the scope of
infringement liability should be expanded to capture those manipulations that led to
the perception of a need for a dilution remedy. The only obstacles to such
expansion are relics of the historical development of trademark law such as the
requirement of commercial proximity and the focus on the mark/maker nexus,
neither of which serve any helpful purpose in a trademark regime focused on
debiasing. By recognizing the debiasing policy that appears to underlie both
infringement and dilution and discarding the historical formalisms that reduce the
correlation between the two, it would be possible to capture nearly all trademark
manipulations under a single remedy, vastly reducing the complexity of this area of
law and correspondingly reducing the opportunities for wasteful litigation and
judicial error.
B. Policy Objections
The suggestion that any species of trademark liability is under-inclusive is
likely to give pause to those who argue that current trademark rights are already too
broad. In particular, the expansion of infringement liability would invariably
dredge up hoary concerns about the granting of "in gross" property rights in
trademarks.23 4 As described in the previous section, however, trademark rights are
234See

supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
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not properly understood as proprietary. Rather, the trademark owner's right is best
understood as a private right of action designed to enforce the systemic market
regulation necessary to harness the efficiencies of boundedly rational consumer
decision-making, which is assigned to the party in the system with the greatest
incentive to monitor the market for behaviors that might generate consumer bias or
error.2 35 That such systemic regulation may resemble a system of property rights in
some of its results does not render the right proprietary; to the contrary, the
dependence of enforcement on the boundedly rational thought processes of
consumers places trademark rights in a state of constant flux, eternally contingent
on the changing commercial environment and the minds of the consumers who fill
it.236 Moreover, this article's characterization of infringement doctrine as underinclusive is ultimately a descriptive judgment, not a normative one. It is my claim
that the debiasing program described in this article is a more satisfactory
descriptive account of modern trademark doctrine than alternative accounts that
rely on unfair competition or property theories. To the extent my claim is valid, the
current limitation of infringement liability based on ad hoc judicial assessments of
the relationship between the commercial spheres of any two litigants is arbitrary
and unjustified. It is precisely the artificiality of this restriction that has given rise
to the dilution remedy, which serves no purpose other than to fill the gaps created
by these historical and formalistic limitations on infringement law (at considerable
costs in terms of the complexity of the legal regime).
Even accepting the non-proprietary nature of the trademark right under the
behavioralist model, one might object that the scope of trademark liability outlined
in this article, dependent as it is on particularly pliable features of human cognition,
has no meaningful limits and could be expanded to a degree that severely limits
commercial freedom and even freedom of speech generally. For example, by
expanding the scope of liability to aggressively reduce error and bias, the law
redistributes power in the marketplace from consumers to producers, reducing
consumer autonomy. 237 This is a particularly troubling step when we consider that
boundedly rational behavior varies across the population, implying that some of the
consumers whose autonomy is restricted by law receive little or no benefit from the
law's more muscular protections.238 Expansive trademark liability can also injure
producers and the market as a Whole, by contributing to a scarcity of useful marks
and thereby raising barriers to entry and generating monopolistic or rent-seeking
233See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
236 See

Beebe, supra note 174, at 2022 ("Trademark law is arguably the most difficult of the intellectual property

laws to contemplate, and its outcomes when applied to facts are the most difficult to predict. This is because it
requires.., the capability.., to think through the consumer and see the marketplace only as the consumer sees it."
(footnotes omitted)).
237 Cf Beebe, supra note 174, at 2066-69 (arguing that the expansion of trademark liability is a self-perpetuating

phenomenon in which producers assume consumer search costs in exchange for the concomitant ability to exert a
stronger persuasive influence over the consumer).
238 See

Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 208, at 226 ("In responding to problems of bounded rationality, it is preferable,

when possible, to develop legal approaches that avoid imposing significant costs on those who do not engage in
boundedly rational behavior." (citation omitted)).
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behavior. 239 And at its furthest extreme, an overriding concern for manipulation of
affective response to trademark could justify all manner of restrictions on
comparative advertising, nominative use, parody, and criticism.
One possible answer to these substantial concerns lies in the administration of
a trademark system consciously designed to address bounded rationality. Because
the cognitive processes discussed in this article are not susceptible to deductive
reasoning, leaving their application to judges is not a particularly reliable method
for achieving the law's goal of proscribing trademark uses that generate bias and
error in consumer decision-making. Judges are just as susceptible to bounded
rationality in adjudication as consumers are in their purchasing decisions.24 °
Moreover, the lack of a rational basis for the cognitive phenomena described in this
article suggests that they are best measured empirically rather than deductively, and
a district judge hearing an application for an injunction in a trademark dispute is a
statistical sample of one. As a result, it seems that in all but the most clear-cut
cases, trademark plaintiffs should bear a substantial burden of providing an
empirical basis for their claims, which would likely take the form of consumer
surveys. For example, point-of-sale manipulations would likely be measured by
consumer surveys of the type courts have become familiar with through experience
with Lanham Act cases,24 1 perhaps with a greater focus on controlled experiments
simulating actual purchasing decisions rather than the traditional model of stimulus
presentation followed by batteries of interrogatories. Ex ante manipulations, in
contrast, would likely require the development of new and different types of
consumer surveys, perhaps incorporating regionalized longitudinal studies that
might in turn become routine parts of trademark enforcement programs.
Even a heavy empirical burden on trademark plaintiffs will not necessarily
alleviate all the problems of overbreadth threatened by the expansive theories of
liability set forth in this article. However, the courts have many prudential
doctrines at their disposal that can act as a pressure release valve on the selfperpetuating engine of liability. For example, the doctrines of genericness (or
inherent distinctiveness generally) 242 and functionality 243 allow courts to deny
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 768-75 (1990) (outlining the problem of
scarcity of useful trademarks); Landes & Posner, supra note 206, at 289-92 (discussing the interrelationship of
elasticity of supply of trademarks and the ability of early market entrants to extract rents).

239 Cf

240 See

Beebe, supra note 114, at 1598-1614 (describing judicial use of heuristics to circumvent the multi-factor

analyses of trademark doctrine); see generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (empirically demonstrating the susceptibility of federal
magistrate judges to a variety of cognitive illusions and biases).
241See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
at
available
2000),
Center
Judicial
ed.
Federal
235
(2d
229,
EVIDENCE
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/scimanOO.pdf/$file/scimanOO.pdf (noting the routine use of survey
evidence in Lanham Act cases).
242See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
243See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (holding that a product feature cannot
serve as a trademark "if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage"); Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
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enforcement of trademark rights, the assertion of which would put the owner's
competitors, or the market in general, at a disadvantage due to problems of scarcity.
Similarly, the requirement of "commercial" use as a prerequisite for liability allows
courts to cut off liability for behavior that has the potential to affect boundedly
rational consumer decision-making but simultaneously implicates other normative
social values. 244 This requirement gives courts wide latitude to wall off whole
areas of human behavior from the reach of trademark liability, from utilitarian
spheres such as news reporting and keyword indexing to expressive spheres such as
commentary, criticism, parody, and appropriationist art.
These prudential
doctrines, unlike the cognitive phenomena that are the primary focus of this article,
do not necessarily require rigorous empirical analysis; finding a balance between
conflicting policy imperatives on a case-by-case basis is a task to which courts are
well accustomed.
Furthermore, while trademark law enjoins persons other than the mark owner
from manipulating consumer reactions to a trademark, it does so only in very
narrow ways. The law leaves the full range of such manipulations open to the mark
owner and noncommercial actors for exploitation. For example, a mark owner
might pursue an advertising campaign based on overwhelming repetition or
affective imagery, generating positive consumer responses that have little or
nothing to do with their experience with the mark owner's product.24 5 Likewise, a
mark owner could leverage the affective reaction to her mark by means of a brandextension strategy such as those described above.246 When properly calibrated,
such a strategy could generate positive affective reactions to a new trademark or
product without any empirical basis for such reactions in consumer experience or in
the realities of production. Generalizing this potential even further, the broad array
of manipulations to which licensing schemes lend themselves have still greater
potential to divorce the affective response to a mark from the empirical realities of
products bearing that mark.24 7 Similarly, affective content is not solely the result of
commercial activity by the mark owner or second comers using the mark on their
products: advertising and even noncommercial speech (including everything from
factual and opinion reporting in established press to private conversations between
individuals) have the potential of altering the affect pool for a trademark in ways
that may or may not generate consumer choices that align subjective expectations
with objective reality. While remedies against false advertising 248 and doctrines
that a trademark will not be enforced where liability "would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range
of adequate alternative designs").
244See 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(l)(a), I 125(a)(1), 1125 (c)(1) (2006).

245See supra notes 143-47, 167-69, 176-78 and accompanying text.
246See supra Part IV.C.2.

247See, e.g., Beebe et al., supra note 4, at 863-66 (providing an overview of the commercial popularity and success
of extensive trademark licensing).
248
See generally Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence:False Advertising under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L.
REV. 807 (1999) (charting the development and shortcomings of false advertising remedies under the Lanham
Act).

2007]

The (Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability

such as the prohibition against "naked licensing ' ' 249 suggest potential tools to
mitigate such abuse by a mark owner and other commercial actors, and defamation
law imposes some limits on noncommercial speech, a behavioralist understanding
of trademark liability implies a broad range of targets for regulation, some of which
may implicate serious First Amendment and other concerns, and all of which
require delicate balancing of harms, benefits, and normative commitments.2 5 °
Finally, some might argue that the model of trademark policy set forth in this
article is overbroad insofar as a second comer might use an existing trademark on
its products the way one might use it in permissible comparative advertising: to
accurately suggest some similarity between the mark owner's products and those of
the second comer. In other words, biased consumer decisions may nevertheless be
good for the consumer if they turn out to be consistent with those that would be
made in conditions of complete information, depending on the circumstances of a
particular second comer's use. In reality, this objection is not to the descriptive
fitness of the behavioralist model, but to the administrability of a legal regime
based on that model. Allowing second comers to use existing marks where such
uses provide accurate information about the second comer's product would
obviously invite abuse and gamesmanship, and distinguishing between helpful and
misleading uses would be a costly endeavor. Moreover, allowing such uses would
warp or eliminate the incentives that allow the state to delegate enforcement to
mark owners through the one-mark-per-manufacturer rule accompanied by a
private right of action. To be sure, this results in a regime that prohibits some
conduct that could aid consumer decision-making. But this result is mitigated by
the fact that the second comer can always take advantage of the regime by creating
a new trademark or seeking a license of the existing mark. Moreover, the social
cost of such prohibitions is likely to be significantly less than the cost of a state-run
regulatory apparatus to provide the same information to consumers with the same
debiasing protections as the privately enforced trademark regime.
The discussion of these objections clearly illustrates the extent to which the
trademark liability regime constitutes a bargain between consumers, producers, and
the state over a particular kind of information transfer. 25 ' The scope and contours
249See Rudolph J. Kuss, The Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How Courts Interpret the Lanham Act to Require

Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing Realities & the
Goals of Trademark Law, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361, 362-71 (2005) (providing an overview of naked

licensing doctrine).
250Such regulatory targets and their analysis are beyond the scope of the present article, but could include the
marketing of generic products, comparative advertising (and indeed advertising in general), and the press.
Moreover, affective content could be influenced by completely random or coincidental circumstances that have
little to do with any conceivable purchasing criteria. For example, if a consumer were hit by a Toyota when
crossing the street, or drinking a 7-Up when she received a call informing her of the death of a loved one, she
might develop negative affective responses to the products and marks involved in those events even though her
experience with such products is otherwise positive. Although this article will not endeavor to explore these
implications of a behavioralist model of consumer decision-making, it is worth noting that even if regulation were
feasible, normative objections to heavy regulation in most of these areas, as in many areas where heuristics play a
role, are significant. Cf Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 208, at 225-34.
251See supra note 212.
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of the regime include tradeoffs, such as acceptance of the costs of potential overinclusiveness in exchange for the benefits of easy decision making and debiasing.
These tradeoffs, in turn, reflect a normative judgment about the benefits of the
bargain-just as the regulation (or lack thereof) of other forms of information
transfer such as advertising, nominative use, parody, and critique reflect normative
judgments about the potential benefits and costs of such regulation. This article's
project is not ultimately to challenge these fundamental judgments about the
wisdom of trademark rights, but rather to offer a descriptively persuasive
explanation for the scope of those rights in an effort to elide counterproductive
formalist debates over the doctrinal architecture undergirding those rights and make
the trademark regime more transparent, comprehensible, and efficient. That the
model discussed herein might lead to a refocused debate over the normative
underpinnings of trademark law-a discussion of whether the debiasing game is in
fact worth the candle-is merely a happy side effect.
V1. Conclusion
This article has attempted to make the case for a reconception of trademark
liability as a debiasing strategy. By drawing parallels between the organically
evolving doctrines of trademark law and the cognitive predicates of bounded
rationality, it has suggested a model of liability that uses existing doctrinal tools to
illustrate the potential for a robust legal regime that would shed the most
disingenuous justifications on which liability now rests, while providing protection
against all currently actionable trademark injuries. Such a reconception of
trademark liability poses particular challenges, notably of administration,
overbreadth, and potential market manipulation. However, it is the premise of this
article that law functions best when it takes an honest view of its subject, the
boundedly rational human, and uses that subject as the measuring stick for doctrine,
adapting its methods to achieve the most desirable results. In this respect, a
behavioralist model of trademark liability has the potential to not only protect the
boundedly rational actor from bias and error, but to harness her cognitive quirks for
her own benefit and the benefit of the market as a whole. Whether those benefits
justify the costs of the regulatory model is a question that should, and doubtless
will, continue to be debated.

